

Unit D 23: The problem of populism

1. Summary

Populism is almost as widespread as democracy. Almost no democracy lacks a populist party. Populism can sharpen democracy on the one hand, but it can also endanger democracy on the other. Populists also do not shy away from questioning essential achievements of democracy, such as human rights or individual fundamental rights.

2. Populism and democracy

One may wonder what the issue of populism has to do with democracy, the state and religious conflicts. Populist movements usually stretch the rules of democracy to the limit - and not infrequently oppose central human and fundamental rights, such as freedom from discrimination or the right to religious freedom.

2.1 The Concept of Populism

Over 50 years ago, Seymour M. Lipset (1963:173) understood populism to be a conglomerate of irrational attitudes, anti-government ideology, and protests, i.e., an "irrational ideology of protest." He saw populism as an anti-democratic, fascist movement-just like Italian fascism or German National Socialism. He then applied the term to Latin American political movements, such as Juan Perón in Argentina (see Lipset 1963:173) and Getulio Vargas in Brazil (see Hartleb 2014:15).

According to Hartleb (2014:16), populism is an international phenomenon that was and is found in tsarist Russia in the form of the Nardoniki, the "people's bumpkins," in the 19th century U.S. in the form of the anti-capitalist protest movements, in the 21st century in the Tea Party movement (cf. Hartleb 2014:131), in Latin America as urban and rural movements, and in 20th century Asia-for example, in the movement around Thaksin in Thailand (cf. Hartleb 2014:125). The notion of populism has mushroomed over time. Among others, Maoist currents have been understood as populist (cf. Hartleb 2014:17 and Priester

2007:116-121), leftist movements such as that of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (cf. Priester 2012:114-163) or earlier the supporters of the Velasco regime in Peru (cf. Stein 2012), but also right-wing conservative movements such as that of George C. Wallace in the USA (cf. Hartleb 2014:19), racist currents such as the Front National in France (cf. Hartleb 2014:22), right-wing foreign parties such as the FPÖ and BZÖ under Haider in Austria (cf. Hartleb 2014:23), but also right-wing conservative movements such as the Swiss People's Party or the Lega di Ticinesi or the Lega Nord in Italy. Hartleb (2014:113) also refers to the movement around comedian Beppe Grillo (the "Grillini") or the Pirate Party in Germany as "variegated" populism. To put it somewhat exaggeratedly, all parties that could not be categorized in the classic right-left scheme were given the label "populist."

This overstretching of the term "populism" has also been pointed out by Priester (2012:35): The concept of populism "has been and continues to be broadened to include phenomena such as 'media populism' or the 'populism' of popular parties" (Priester 2012:35). Thus, the term loses its bite and also its meaningfulness. Yet another overstretching of the concept of populism can be noted: When, for example, Markus Ackeret (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 30, 2017:3) writes that the SPD candidate for chancellor and convinced European Martin Schulz represents a "social democratic populism" because he offers popular solutions and wants to score points with the "little people," this is simply nonsense. On the one hand, popular solutions are not simply "populist" per se, and on the other hand, the "little people" do not simply want populist solutions, they want their concerns to be taken seriously. Rather, the ambivalence of populist proposed solutions is problematic: They pretend to take social concerns seriously, but always do so at the expense of individual disadvantaged or demonized population groups - for example, "foreigners" or "Muslims."

According to Joachim Günter (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3.5.2016:14), it is frightening - and dangerous for democracy - that populist regimes on the one hand present themselves as close to the people, as the voice of the people, even as grassroots democracy, but in reality tip over into authoritarianism and threaten diversity of opinion and cultural freedom. In fact, they may very well dismantle basic civil rights - such as religious freedom for individual minorities, such as Muslims - and undermine or subvert democratic rules of the game in order to push through their own particular interests, which are often hostile to democracy.

Moreover, such movements - such as the SVP in Switzerland or the AfD in Germany - deliberately seek to aggravate the political climate, which can go as far as personally denigrating their opponents - such as SVP politician Köppel's personal attacks on Federal Councillor Sommaruga before the Swiss parliament in spring 2016.

However, it should not be forgotten that populist movements also have liberal elements. For example, a classic populist leitmotif is the "early liberal ideal" of "individual self-determination" (cf. Günter in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 3, 2016:14). However - one would have to add - this liberal right to individual self-determination is not represented equally for all people, but denied to individual population groups, such as the "foreigners", the "asylum seekers" or the "Muslims", who are gladly portrayed as "parasites", "profiteers" or "terrorists". It is no coincidence that (right-wing) populism experienced a hype in Europe in the aftermath of the great wave of refugees in 2015, when many Europeans felt threatened by the new arrivals (see Jäggi 2016 for a detailed discussion).

In his critical essay, Michael Schefczyk (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23.1.2017b:27) pointed out that already John Stuart Mill emphasized that in public discussions people who hold a different or opposing opinion are often labeled and disqualified as "bad" or "immoral" people. This is especially true for representatives of populist positions, but - unfortunately! - often also for their opponents! Undoubtedly, Mill's statement that one should never forget that even the most determined opponent of one's own opinion has reasons for his position is very justified. This is true even if these reasons lead to convictions that we do not find acceptable. After all, every conviction has its own individual history and is the result of experience - of whatever kind.

Joachim Günter (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3.5.2016:14) has also rightly emphasized that the supporters of populist movements cannot be blanketly dismissed as "losers of modernization." Neither the AfD in Germany nor the SVP in Switzerland owes its success solely to the vote of the short-sighted. Nor can populists be "put through the social-psychological mill" in the "elation of moral superiority."

But the phenomenon behind the term must be taken seriously. Not only can it become a serious threat to democracy, but - even worse - it can lead indirectly to totalitarian government.

Populism can thus also be understood as an unscrupulous instrumentalization of democracy or individual elements of it, such as referendums. In this process, existing resentment or distrust of the political elite is exploited and deliberately deepened with the goal of replacing the - democratically legitimized - political elite and transforming or abolishing the democratic system in line with one's own interests.

This aspect of populism has been emphasized, among others, by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (cf. Hirschi in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19.6.2017:27), who, in the context of a study of 268 parties in 31 European countries, came to the conclusion that the success of (right-wing) populist parties was not the result of a rebellion of economic-political have-nots and population groups that had been shortchanged, but the consequence of a cultural "backslash" against cosmopolitan liberalism. In other words, it was a protest against the "corrupt establishment" (Hirschi in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19.6.2017:27) and a rebellion against today's political-economic elites. However, one would have to explain - if this is true - why this protest is discharged via godfathers and movements that hardly pursue a different policy in terms of economic policy than the criticized elites. Therefore, this "anti-elitism" may be an element of populism, but it does not explain the phenomenon comprehensively.

2.2 Populism as Ideology and as Strategy

Hartleb (2014:42) has pointed out that the scientific understanding of populism is almost as hotly contested as populist movements themselves.

There are two main understandings of populism in the literature: on the one hand, the "strategy school" and, on the other, the "ideology school." Representatives of the latter also see populism as a "thin centered ideology" (Priester 2012:12) or a "host ideology."

A third, post-Marxist position sees populism as an "ideology-creating discourse practice with the goal of hegemony" (Hartleb 2014:42, see also Laclau 2005a). Thus, populist discourse serves less ideological goals - which are "thin" and contradictory anyway - but the creation of political hegemony (Priester 2012:45), which then generates ideology in the first place (cf. Laclau 2005b).

It is not uncommon for populism to be reduced to a particular style of politics (cf. Hartleb 2014:43). However, this position must be countered by the fact that, in terms of content, populism can adopt almost any position from the extreme left to the extreme right. Due to this diversity in content and ideology, Priester (2012:34), following Canovan (cf. e.g. 2005), concludes "that ultimately only one common denominator of populism remains: populist rhetoric." Populists are usually good self-dramatizers, such as Christoph Blocher in Switzerland, Donald Trump in the U.S., or - at the time - Jörg Haider in Austria. Lewandowsky (2010:26) names the following forms of staging populism:

- Media-friendly theatricalization and staging,
- Event politics,
- Image politics, and
- Symbolic sham politics.

Weyland (2001)-as another concept for understanding populism-has named three criteria of populism: "first, the appeal to a heterogeneous mass of followers, many of whom are subjectively or objectively excluded [=excluded, note CJ] from society; second, a low level of institutionalization of the movement or party; third, a direct link between leader and followers" (Hartleb 2014:43).


Populism arises from a negative distinction from the respective political establishment: "First, populism is method and style" (Hartleb 2014:44).

Wejnert (2014:146) paraphrased populism as the "voice of the people against the elite," specifically

- as a movement of the masses underrepresented or unrepresented in politics;
- that has no mouthpiece for its concerns and worries;

- which rails against "the establishment" - also called the political elite or "classe politique" (Switzerland) - and
- identifies with "the people" as a monolithic bloc.

Hartleb (2014:47) has pointed out another often overlooked characteristic of populism: "Populism is characterized precisely by its inconsistency." The populist view of the (political) world has four points of reference:



Hartleb (2014:51) has outlined these four cornerstones as follows:

We	Our people = „the people“	The-up-there	The-there-outside
Genuine, good, capable, hard-working, grassroots, freedom-loving, homogeneous, common interests, against the "political elite", the ignored, the cheated, the taken advantage of	Clean, blameless, order-loving, honest, patriotic, close to home, tradition-conscious, disenfranchised by the elite, silent majority	The "establishment", the "classe politique", career and professional politicians pursuing their own interests, arrogant, intransparent, "one hand washes the other", clientelism, lobby interests, bureaucratic, undemocratic	Foreigners, "bad", "evil", foreigners, people of other faiths, "ghetto culture", "social parasites" - but also globalization turbos, capitalists, cosmopoliticians

Source: Adapted from Hartleb 2014:51, edited and added by CJ.

Jan-Werner Müller (2016:81) has spoken of a "symbolic narrowing" by populism in this context. In this process, constitutions that seek to preserve pluralism are usually undermined by anti-pluralist measures. For example, by removing term limits for important state functions, dismissing non-compliant judges and replacing them with judges loyal to the regime (e.g. in Turkey under Erdogan or in Hungary under Orban), undermining democratic structures, e.g. through "people's committees" or similar power structures (e.g. in Venezuela under Chávez), or attempting to exclude parts of the population or citizens (e.g. calling naturalized Swiss "Papierlischweizer").

For populists, then, the division of society is not between left and right or between social classes, but between "the people" and the political elite (cf. Priester 2012:12), i.e. between "us" and "the others," with the latter being defined as "the ones up there," "foreigners," the "Europeans," or simply the "bad ones," depending on the situation. This also gives rise to quite bizarre alliances. In January 2017, for example, Marine Le Pen of the French Front National, Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, Harald Vilimsky, the secretary general of the Freedom Party of Austria, Matteo Salvini of the Italian Lega Nord, and Frauke Petry of Alternative Deutschland (AfD) came together in the Rhein-Mosel-Halle in Koblenz for a first "group picture of the Union of Anti-Europeans" (Nuspliger in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 23, 2017a:5). At the same time, the audience chanted "Lügenpresse, Lügenpresse." The various political speakers tried to define who belonged to the true people and who did not. Keywords here were "Islamization" (Wilders), "uncontrolled population reshuffling" (Petry), and - last but not least - the common rage against Brussels (cf. Nuspliger in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 23, 2017a:5).

In the opinion of Georg Franck (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 6.2.2017:8), two factors play a central role in the release of resentment: On the one hand, significant parts of the population must - as Franck writes - have made "acquaintance with hardship" or at least have had serious experiences of economic or social deprivation, i.e., for example, successive and irreversible social decline, long periods of unemployment, loss of their livelihood or loss of their property. On the other hand, social networks have created ideal platforms for the expression of anger, frustration or aggression, but also lies and untruths (fake news); Franck (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6.2.2017:8) even speaks of a "veritable dam burst" by the business ideas of Facebook, Twitter, etc.

Burmeister/Achatz (2012:106-112) have identified the following as demanders of populism from the perspective of democratic theory:

- The **unenlightened democrat** who allows himself to be lulled by sleight of hand and does not see through it;
- The **disaffected democrat**, who is disturbed by system failures, elite aloofness and injustice; and

- The **marginalized democrat** who finds too little room in negotiated democracy and political management for affects, grievances, sensitivities and moral sensibilities.

Populism thus provides ideological and affective responses to real or apparent social problems, to feelings of uprootedness, or to a lack of home.

Jan-Werner Müller (2016:63) has pointed out that populism "does not want to shake the principle of political representation per se," but wants to prevent "false representatives" from being produced. And "false" representatives are those who do not agree with the political goals of the populists. This confirms the thesis that populism is a strategic project to achieve ideological-political hegemony. Müller (2016:70) has therefore rightly pointed out "that populists use very specific techniques of rule, respectively, that they cultivate a style of government all their own - and that this is in line with their moral claim to sole representation." In doing so - always according to Müller (2016:74) - populists primarily make use of three "techniques of rule": Taking possession of the state, clientelism, and discrediting any opposition. However, one could object here that these "techniques of domination" are also used by other political currents or movements, such as conservatives, liberals or socialists.

In terms of ideological-political orientation, there are very different forms (and contents!) of populism. There is left-wing and right-wing populism (cf. Priester 2012). Lewandowsky (2010) even speaks of a "populism of the center" using New Labour as an example. All this seems to indicate that the political content in populism is rather secondary, or rather instrumentalized towards the goal.

Spier (2006:51) sees the voters of right-wing populism primarily as losers of modernization. However, this applies above all to Europe and the USA. In Latin America, by contrast, left-wing populism has more of a social reformist thrust.

But populism is also-if not primarily-a strategy for gaining or retaining power, but it operates largely or at least partly outside democratic institutions. Barr (2009) has distinguished three modes in relation to electorate and leader(s): a participatory, a patronage, and a plebiscitary

mode. While in Latin America, for example, the clientelist mode was most common, the Swiss People's Party, for example, works primarily with plebiscitary means, i.e., initiatives and referendums that are voted on.

Populist movements have not only a political, but also an economic and a cultural side:

	Background, causes	Ideology	Appearance, organization	Effect
Economic	Distribution crisis, impoverishment	Protectionism, anti-globalization, in some areas ultra-liberal (e.g. against market regulations)	Personality-centered (personality cult)	diffuse
Cultural	Identity crisis, crisis of meaning	xenophobic, national, anti-liberal, against international agreements	Backward-looking cultural understanding, national myths	
Political	Lack of representation	Anti-party attitude, direct democracy (plebiscites)	Authoritarian, incapable of criticism	polarizing

Source: Adapted from Decker 2006:22; edited and added by CJ.

2.3 Forms of Populism

Conniff (2012:10-14) distinguished the following phases of populism with regard to Latin America:

First period:

1900 - 1920: José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903-1907; 1911-1915) in Uruguay; Guillermo Billinghurst (1912-1914) in Peru;

1920 - 1940: Widespread populism: populist elements in Arturo Alessandri's politics and the Regering Marmaduke Grove in Chile in 1932; Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre political campaign in Peru; Pedro Ernesto Baptista and Adhemar de Barros in Brazil; Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico.

Second period:

1940s - 1960s: Getúlio Vargas, Jânio Quadros, Juscelino Kubitschek, Carlos Lacerda, Miguel Arraes, Leonel Brizola and João Goulart in Brazil, Juan Perón

and Evita Perón in Argentina, Arnulfo Arias in Panama, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Jorge Gaitán's populist campaign in Colombia, Eddie Chibás in Cuba, Carlos Ibáñez in Chile.

There were also a number of populist governments in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Carlos Menem 1989 - 1995 in Argentina, Collor de Melo 1990 - 1992 in Brazil (see Conniff 2012:13).

In Europe, according to Priester (2012:230), there were four populist waves:

- **1st wave** late 19th century to 1930s;
- **2nd wave** in late 1940s to mid-1950s;
- **3rd wave** in the 1970s: Founding of the Danish (1972) and Norwegian (1973) Progressive Parties, transformation of the former Peasants, Trades and Citizens Party BGB into the Swiss People's Party in Switzerland (1971), founding of the Flemish Vlaams Blok (1979) in Belgium and in France (1972) the Front National emerged (cf. Priester 2012:231);
- **4th wave** in the 1990s until after the turn of the millennium: Foundation of the Lega Nord in Italy, foundation of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in 1993 in Great Britain, foundation of the Swedish New Democracy in 1991 (cf. Priester 2012:231).

Today, one would have to add a fifth wave of populism:

- **5th wave** since about 2015: Brexit vote in the UK in 2016; election of U.S. President Donald Trump in 2016; increasingly autocratic regimes of Recep Erdogan in Turkey-especially after the coup attempt in 2016-and of Vladimir Putin in Russia.

It is striking that at least the last three waves were primarily represented by right-wing populist movements.

In terms of method, populism tends toward plebiscitary and acclamatory procedures (cf. Hartleb 2014:55) - or toward an emporilization of direct democracy (Switzerland!).

Hartleb (2014:209) has argued that populism and technocracy form, in a sense, two sides of the same coin. According to Hartleb (2014:209), a comparison of the technocratic, populist and liberal understanding of government reveals certain parallels between technocracy and populism:

	Technocracy	Populism	Liberal Model
Ideas	Expert opinions, specialism, "view from above"	Constructed will of the people, claimed by a leader figure	Exchange, discourse and competition; majority principle
Political Institutions	Contempt, expert knowledge instead of democratic legitimacy	Contempt, attack against political elite, parliament as "chatterbox" of "those up there"; bypassing, instead "direct democracy"	Supporting role of parliament and executive, direct democracy as a supplement possible
Pluralism	Disdain: expertocracy	Contempt (people with different opinion are "traitors")	Pluralistic basic attitude, equal representation of all minorities
Level of knowledge	Experts have a monopoly on decision-making, technical language, expert knowledge	"People's voice", anti-intellectualism, simple slogans	Diversity of opinion, openness and breadth of knowledge
Electoral principle	Factually out of force	Important in opposition, limited by authoritarianism and after gaining power	Fundamentally important and part of the political system

Source: Adapted from Hartleb 2014:209; edited and added by CJ.

Populism thus stands in contrast to parties and movements that represent fundamental and reasonably clear ideological and substantive values, such as the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, the Socialists and the Greens. In contrast, the content of populist parties is rather vague, sometimes interchangeable and contradictory.

2.4 Populism and Islamophobia

Many - especially right-wing populist - movements are explicitly or unspokenly anti-Islamic. The most recent example in Germany, for example, was the Pegida movement in 2014 ("Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident"), or in Switzerland the ban on minarets, which was pushed through in a referendum in 2009. The burqa ban (France, Canton Ticino in Switzerland) can also be traced back to populist efforts.

The Islamophobic attitude is quite evident among (right-wing) populist parties in Europe.

Just as it has long been known from racism research that there is no correlation between the proportion of foreigners and the phenomenon of racism, there is also no causality between the number of Muslims living here and Islamophobia (see Hartleb 2014:179). Islamophobia is thus primarily an expression of a corresponding social discourse, and populist parties have excellently mastered the art of setting certain discourse themes.

2.5 Populism as a Threat to Democracy?

Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012:205) have rightly pointed out that populism is in tension with (liberal) democracy. On the one hand, populist movements criticize the "abuse" of democratic procedures; indeed, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012:208) suggest that populism is a kind of "democratic extremism" because it is particularly suspicious of all kinds of unelected bodies, which have become so powerful in recent years and decades. For this reason, populists often call for plebiscitary decision-making mechanisms.

According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012:208), populism has positive and/or negative effects on democracy. This depends on two things, first, whether the main actors of populism are in opposition to the government and, second, whether the democratic government is "consolidated" or not (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012:208). If the latter is true, then even a populist party in government can do little to change the quality of democracy and it is sufficiently "robust" to deal with the populist challenge, according to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012:208). What can be positive about populism is that it gives a political voice to those who are not represented in government (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012:209).

Conversely, populists - Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012:205 cite Hugo Chávez in Venezuela as an example - have little respect for checks and balances in democracies with weak institutions, which is why such a democratic system can collapse or implode under the pressure of populism. Populists in power can also lead to an authoritarian regime, such as Fujimori in Peru. This is because-so the thesis goes-populists are political "outsiders," because populists see their mission as burying the political establishment, and because the political elite they

mobilized against continues to control the institutions (see Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012:215).

What is dangerous about (European) populism is its disrespect for democratic and social achievements such as human rights for all, freedom from discrimination, and socio-ethical concerns: for example, the Swiss People's Party demanded the cancellation of Switzerland's signature to the European Convention on Human Rights, humanitarian concerns are denigrated, and entire populations are collectively condemned: For example, asylum seekers, Muslims, or welfare recipients. Thus, right-wing populism is much more than a right-wing conservative political movement - it is a frontal attack against democracy and human rights.

Is there already something like a "populist international"? In any case, there is something like a coalition of the "humiliated and insulted" (Chizhova 2016:10) that extends beyond national borders.

This is also true at the top level. In January 2017, for example, it became known that former British Ukip leader Nigel Farage has privileged access to U.S. President Trump, explaining to him how Europe works (see Hess in 2017:9). When Trump even recommended Farage via Twitter to the British government as the new British ambassador to the U.S., May's government dryly noted that it still appoints its own ambassadors and that there is currently no vacancy (cf. Hess 2017:9).

That populist movements know no fear of contact is shown, for example, by the fact that the Austrian FPÖ party leader Heinz-Christian Strache and the defeated FPÖ presidential candidate Norbert Hofer met in December 2016 with leading exponents of Vladimir Putin's party, United Russia, for a "working meeting" and signed a "cooperation agreement" between the two parties (cf. Baumann 2016:5). Politics truly creates strange bedfellows!

However, it is doubtful whether one can go as far as Elena Chizhova (2016:10), who wrote: "I am afraid the 'Putin phenomenon' has turned out to be more influential than it seemed a few years ago. Without Putin, Trump would not exist."

The political arbitrariness of populist groups is also matched by the fact that they are very careless - not to say irresponsible - with the truth and with facts. However, one should be careful not to draw conclusions from this about a "post-factual" or "post-truth age".

A popular strategy of populist politics is the reversal of concepts into their opposite and their unscrupulous instrumentalization: concepts such as democracy, solidarity and freedom are thereby reversed into their opposite: "Democracy no longer means rule of the people and enforcement of general interests, but random majorities for unscrupulous demagogues through emotionalized factual issues. Solidarity no longer means protection and help for the weaker, but exclusion, sanctioning and disciplining of social deviance, psychological deficits and deviant lifestyles and - above all - protection of the status quo from [alleged] abuses. Freedom is no longer understood as personal autonomy, equal opportunities and acceptance of the other, but as the right to enforce one's own interests as hard as nails - without interference from state or societal disruptors" (Jäggi in VPOD Education Policy, March 2017:41).

Ethics and truth as a prerequisite for democratic politics

Scientific knowledge is not possible without commitment to truth - or to truths. If truth is arbitrary, if truth and untruth can no longer be distinguished, science leads itself ad absurdum.

Truths have social, economic or societal dimensions. Therefore, enlightened, emancipative thinking must always be committed to truth - neither faked news nor conspiracy theories, often two sides of the same coin - are acceptable. Also (too) strong reductionism - unfortunately also quite common in scientific and popular science discourse - is in contrast to the usually more complex and differentiated truth.

Untruth - we know this at the latest since Karl Marx - can only be fought by truth, compared to untruth truth has an emancipative character. Especially also with untruths one must always ask "cui bono?", that is, whom do they benefit?

Truths - even uncomfortable ones - benefit the general public in the long run. Truth is always differentiated, multi-layered and multi-dimensional - but it also changes.

Social science knowledge and social progress are ultimately only possible if researchers and social actors are interested in truth - and committed to the common good. In the absence of commitment to the common good, research is purely interest-driven and policy pursues particular interests. If the interest in truth is absent, then research becomes unnecessary and politics becomes pure Macchiavellianism. Both lead to the burial of democracy.

Source: Jäggi in VPOD Bildungspolitik March 2017:42.

3. Kontrollfragen

1. Why is the issue of populism important for a democracy?
2. Give three examples of populist movements in the European and non-European area.
3. What is the danger of overstretching the concept of populism?
4. What are the two main (scientific) understandings of populism?
5. What are the four methods or approaches used by populism? 6.
6. What three criteria does Weyland name for populist movements?
7. What four characteristics of populism does Wejnert name?
8. What characterizes populism in terms of content?
9. What four reference points does the populist view of the world have according to Hartleb?
10. What three types of demanders for populist politics do Burmeister/Achatz name?
11. What can be said about populism from a strategic point of view?
12. What three modes of populism in relation to the electorate does Barr name?
13. What two periods of populism in Latin America does Conniff distinguish?
14. What four waves of populism have there been in Europe since World War II?
15. How did the voter potential of populist parties in Europe develop since 1980?
16. What are the similarities and differences between (political) technocracy, populism and liberal representativeness?
17. How does Islamophobia manifest itself in European populism?
18. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, to what extent is populism an opportunity and to what extent a danger for democracy?
19. Why is populism an attack on democracy?

4. Links

Demokratie wohin? Die Grenzen des Populismus

<http://www.srf.ch/kultur/gesellschaft-religion/demokratie-wohin-die-grenzen-des-populismus>

Rechtspopulismus in Europa - Vergängliches Phänomen oder auf dem Weg zum politischen Mainstream?

Von Werner T. Bauer

<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07293.pdf>

Populismus: Erscheinungsformen, Entstehungshintergründe und Folgen eines politischen Phänomens

<http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/41192/was-ist-rechtspopulismus?p=all>

Populismus ist das süsse Gift der Politik

<http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article133597387/Populismus-ist-das-suesse-Gift-der-Politik.html>

Populismus: Europas Anti-Parteien

<http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2013-05/protestparteien-europa-antieuro>

Populismus in Europa: Angebot und Nachfrage

<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/populismus-in-europa-angebot-und-nachfrage-12741031.html>

Populismus in Europa: Das sind die Europa-Skeptiker

<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/populismus-in-europa-das-sind-die-europaskeptiker-1.1933410>

Steigende Sozialkosten: Populismus ist die falsche Strategie

<http://www.nzz.ch/meinung/kommentare/populismus-ist-falsche-strategie-1.18464536>

5. Cited literature and further readings

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