Unit D 42: Global Governance

1.   Summary

Global governance is now widely regarded as the best - or least bad? - way to manage international and global affairs. Starting from the regularities of the international state system, the paradigm of global governance is discussed. One particular form of global governance is the G-7/G-8 and G-20 world summit meetings. The assessments of the global governance approach are very different, even controversial.

2.   National and international democracy

We have dealt with questions of domestic, national democracy in ► Unit D 15: "Human Rights, Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional State". In contrast, questions about democratic arrangements also arise at the international and global level.

2.1   International political regulatory systems

Frank Schimmelfennig (2013:32) has pointed out that poverty and social inequality are much more difficult to influence through an anarchic international system than in a nation-state context. First, many resources such as oceans, climate, or space but also problem areas such as migration are international. Second, unlike nation-states, the international organizations that exist today cannot levy taxes, so their ability to act is very limited and dependent on the large nation-states. Third, in contrast to national markets, there is much less international legal regulation of world markets. And fourth - it should be added - many different power-political and geostrategic interests dominate at the international level, which are not - as in nation states - bundled by an overarching government.

According to Jürgen Neyer (2013:18), the view of international politics has shifted significantly in recent years and decades. This applies not only to the empirical, concrete situation, but also to the subject-specific and academic approaches to international relations

Empirical Framework	**Disciplinary Implications**

Yesterday

| Democratic Nation-State | |
| International system | Analysis of conflict and cooperation (classical international relations) |

Today

| Multi-level governments | |
| Transnational society | Analysis of the conditions and possibilities of democracy in cross-border contexts (de-bordered democracy studies) |

Source: Neyer 2013:18.

The view of international relations has become more complex on the one hand and more dynamic on the other. Neyer (2013:237) has distinguished the following world order models:

	Congruence	**Participation**	**Control**	**Decision-making ability**	**Enforcement capability**
"Weak" World State	unproblematic	comprehensive	limited	unproblematic	unproblematic
Transnational society	unproblematic	comprehensive, but North-South asymmetry	low	low	low
Confederation of democracies	limited	only democratic governments	limited	good	limited
Multilateralism	unproblematic	governments only	limited	limited	limited

Source: Neyer 2013:237.

Archibugi et al. (2012:7/8) have distinguished three ideal types of global democracy:

Confederalism   Federalism

Polycentrism ("global governance")

Source: Archibugi et al. 2012:7.

The authors call the **first type**, confederalism, "intergovernmental democratic multilateralism," by which they mean fair and **voluntary agreements among democratic states**, or international democracy based on communitarian principles (Archibugi et al. 2012:7). The League of Nations, for example, or the "Concert of Democracies" functioned according to this principle.

The **second type** of international democracy, i.e. federalism, is described by Archibugi et al. (2012:8) as **"world government"** or "world federation". Unlike confederalism, where citizens do not have direct access to political decision-making, here there is direct democratic citizen participation through elections or voting, and democratic rights are combined with an international federal governance structure. A federal state can be considered as a model, only here on a supranational level. We will deal with this type in detail in ► Unit D 43: "The missing world state.

The **third ideal type** of international democracy is today usually subsumed under the term **"global governance".** Some authors speak euphemistically of "global stakeholder democracy" (Macdonald 2012:47). Macdonald (2012:48) sees the advantage of "stakeholder democracy" paradoxically in the fact that individuals or groups who are not affected by political decisions at the global level can be excluded from them. However, it could be argued here that ultimately all people are affected by globalization, some more, others less

or indirectly. This is precisely the position taken by supporters of egalitarian democracy. They argue against "stakeholder democracy" that it allows to marginalize those groups that are already marginalized (cf. Macdonald 2012:52).

Archibugi et al. (2012:8) have suggested that instead of "global governance" we should speak of polycentrism - a more sober and probably more accurate term. Here, governance power - if one can speak of it - or as Archibugi et al. (2012:8) call it: "today's global space power" is exercised by states and by a myriad of non-state actors (NGOs, i.e. Non Governmental Organizations), such as corporations, associations, aid agencies, specialized international organizations, social movements and expert networks, etc.

2.2   The Governance Paradigm

The political science paradigm of governance research emerged in the 1990s out of the crisis of state governance theory(s) and in connection with the discussions about the "negotiating state" (cf. Arndt 2014:41):

Definition of "Governance
"The term governance, borrowed from economics, has in a short time become a guiding concept in political science, but also in other social sciences, as it seems to be able to title many of the more recent and at least today interesting phenomena of governance in a broader sense both process- and structure-oriented. Governance is thereby understood as 'governing with a big R' (Risse), 'modern governance', 'governing in complex systems of rules' (Benz 2010), 'network politics', and much more. With the conceptualization of 'global governance', moreover, another, only partially overlapping body of literature is touched upon, which had formed in parallel in the field of international relations and which has its origin in the attempts to find a new term for the 'world domestic politics' deemed necessary in the no longer really 'anarchic' but also not hierarchical international system, which does justice to the increasing interdependence and diversity of actors (Brand et al. 2000)."
Source: Arndt 2014:41.

In the sense of Mayntz's (2010:37) very general definition, governance is "the totality of the forms of collective regulation of social affairs that coexist in a political order". In contrast to "government," governance refers to the process of governing (Bevir 2012:2): "It is what governments do to their citizens. But it is also what corporations and other organizations do to their employees and members" (= "it is what governments do for their citizens. But it is

also what corporations and other organizations do to their employees and members").
Governance processes do not have to be organized by hierarchically organized actors.

Definition of "Global Governance
Global governance is a "new form of 'world governance' which, according to theory, represents multilateral cooperation that takes place largely beyond formal institutional hierarchies."
Source: Hidalgo 2014:467.

Governance refers "to all processes of social organization and social coordination. Governance differs from government because social organization needs neither overview nor control" (Bevir 2012:3). Markets and networks know governance even without any (state) government. This more theoretical view of governance is contrasted with a purely practical or empirical understanding of governance: This refers to "changing organizational practices within corporations, the public sector, and the global order" (Bevir 2012:3; retranslated from German by DeepL).

Definition "Global Governacne"
Global governance consists of "rule-making and provision of collective goods in the international system, [and] mostly assumes that consolidated states will implement these rules domestically and voluntarily abide by them because it is in their own interest to do so. International 'governance without government' implicitly assumes that states can comply with global rules if they only want to."
Source: Braml/Risse/Sandschneider 2010:9.

The research perspective of the governance approach initially focuses on a functional approach in the sense of the provision of certain political regulatory services (= governance services, cf. Risse-Lehmkuhl 2006 and Arndt 2014:42).

"At its core, governance research ... is concerned with mechanisms and effects of coordinating the actions of - more or less autonomous - actors within a particular institutional structure... The focus of the governance approach is therefore on the problem of managing interdependence by different actors ... and the forms in which this takes place. The focus is thus on the forms and mechanisms of action coordination through different

modes of governance, which in turn are linked to form task-related governance regimes (Trute et al. 2008:174).

In the governance approach, a distinction can be made between forms of governance by government, governance with government, and governance without government (cf. Arndt 2014:42). Three levels of governance can be distinguished: The level of concrete actor action, the level of area-dependent forms of coordination, and the level of analysis of entire political systems (cf. Arndt 2014:42). In line with the "functionalist service delivery perspective" (Arndt 2014:42), power aspects are not infrequently omitted in favor of a pure input-output orientation (cf. Mayntz 2010:46 and Arndt 2014:42/43).

Nadia Urbinati (2003:80) has paraphrased the distinction between "government" and "governance" as follows: "'Governance' involves an explicit reference to 'mechanisms' or 'organized' and 'coordinated activities' as conducive to solving specific problems. Unlike 'government,' governance refers to programs, not policies, because it is not a binding, decision-making structure" (quoted from the German translation in Mouffe 2007:135/136). According to Mouffe (2007:136), "the central point in global governance ... is negotiation between the most diverse associations and interest groups with special competence, which intervene in very specific issues and try to bring their proposals to bear in some form." One could also say that democratic and publicly supported solutions are replaced by contractual solutions in the global governance approach, as between private actors. Robert Dahl (1999:23) has taken the clear position that global governance and international decision-making processes cannot be considered democratic (see also Mouffe 2007:137). Yes, Dahl (1999:19) goes one step further: "An international organization is not and cannot be a democracy." This is undoubtedly true for existing international organizations - but does it have to be so in principle? Are there no conceivable international associations or transnational constitutional arrangements that are democratic?

At least if one understands democracy - as Dahl does - as "a system of control by the governed over the government's programs and decisions" (Mouffe 2007:137, cf. also Dahl 1999:20), international decision-making in the sense of global governance is not democratic, or at best indirectly democratically legitimized. Dahl warns (Dahl 1999:32, according to the

German translation by Mouffe 2007:138) against "dressing international organizations in the cloak of democracy just to endow them with greater legitimacy." In Dahl's opinion, such international negotiations are more likely to be seen as "bureaucratic negotiation systems" that, while necessary, "operate at the expense of democracy" (Mouffe 2007:138).

Therefore, Dahl (1999:33) answered the question of what then international organizations are, if not democratic organizations, as follows: International organizations are "bureaucratic systems of negotiation." Here, the respective actors negotiate within the framework of certain parameters: For example, the opinions and guidelines of their governments, the attitude of the public or important public actors, value concepts and - last but not least - hard-core economic and political particular interests.

The governance approach considers not only vertical, hierarchical structures, but also horizontal network and negotiation arrangements (see Arndt 2014:43).

In summary, "the governance approach has focused attention on complex 'architectures' of mechanisms for coordinating action, revealing a change in the forms of political power. With non-governmental organizations, expert panels, new forms and sites of citizen participation, etc. in the context of multi-level systems and 'complex governance arrangements', a variety of new actors have been inserted into the older, state and corporatist large-scale organizational picture, changing the perception of the power structure (which does not necessarily correspond to a democratization tendency of reality or research orientation...)" (Arndt 2014:44). In other words, there is a case to be made that the governance approach does not describe a changed situation of international conflict regimes and interstate arrangements, but merely captures the same inter- and transnational situations as before with finer methods of analysis. Nevertheless, the governance approach can open up new approaches to action in international politics, simply because additional actors are captured and thus additional approaches to solutions are opened up.

Oliver Hidalgo (2014:468) has pointed out that recently there has been "increasing resistance to the universalizing and unipolarizing tendencies of global governance ... of which international terrorism is only the clearest symptom. Chantal Mouffe (2007:118ff. as

well as 139; see also Hidalgo 2014:468) has also claimed that "cosmopolitanism" or notions of a global democratic consensus are no more than a dangerous illusion. However, it has to be said that in the longer term the world will not be able to avoid a global (democratic world state) at all, because the economy has long since become global and also needs clear global regulatory mechanisms that are also enforced. However, this far exceeds the possibilities of global governance (for a detailed discussion of the question of a world state, cf. ► Unit D 43: "The Missing World State").

The governance approach has been criticized for being "a curiously subjectless form of governance" (Schuppert 2014:22). However, Schuppert objects to this in two ways: firstly, it is also possible to steer through institutions, and secondly, this institutional steering is by no means subjectless, because it is rather interest-led actors who are active within the framework of global governance (cf. Schuppert 2014:22). However, it could be argued - against Schuppert - that there is a significant difference between the actions of individual actors and the targeted steering of international developments - just as an individual market actor can act in a (functioning) market but cannot steer it. The global governance approach runs the risk of confusing the actions of individual actors with the steering of a complex system.

Another problem of the global governance approach lies in the functioning of the global market economy. This is characterized by the fact that it regularly falls from the regular mode into a crisis mode, which can lead to destruction of capital, unemployment, poverty and impoverishment of entire countries (cf. also Jäggi 2016:20f. and 30f.). Willke and Willke (2012:60) have illustrated this problem in the following diagram:

Figure 3.1   Market capitalism and reactions to disturbances

Source: Willke/Willke 2012:60.

With regard to the global governance approach, the problem is that nation-states always have to come to a laborious agreement first in economic crisis situations, and that individual states can always pull out. Moreover, interventions are either voluntary or occur via the large, hegemonic states or alliances.

Correctly, Schuppert (2014:23) distinguishes between an analytical-descriptive and a normative use of the governance term: while the latter is about "good governance" - i.e. pragmatic issues - in the academic discussion the governance term is mainly used analytically-descriptively (cf. Schuppert 2014:24).

Global governance is also about a transnational diffusion of ideas and concerns. With regard to environmental issues, Busch and Jörgens (2012:238) have pointed out that diffusion processes - that is, ways and mechanisms of disseminating ideas - can be used for governance activity. This requires, first, channels for transnational communication processes; second, the provision of information for international discourse; third, models and concepts that are "communicable"; fourth, the use of "peers" (i.e., people with the same concerns and professional colleagues) to drive diffusion; fifth, increasing transparency; sixth, increasing one's own local capacities; and seventh, the ability to take advantage of all opportunities that arise (see Busch/Jörgens 2012:238-242).

2.3   The G-7 to G-20 Summits: Also a Form of Global Governance

Also a form of global governance are the summits of heads of government, which take place at intervals again and again.

On February 14, 1950, Winston Churchill - in the midst of the Cold War - demanded in Edinburgh "another talk with the Soviet Union at the highest level" (Reynolds 2014:12), adding: It was "not easy to see how matters could be worsened by a parley at the summit" (quoted in Reynolds 2014:12). Since then, the term "summit" has become part of the vocabulary of international politics.

Of course, there had been summits before. The most famous were the 1938 meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler, the 1943 summit in Tehran between the leaders of the Allies, and the 1945 Yalta conference attended by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. In June 1961, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev met in Vienna, and in the 1980s there was a series of summits between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that helped bring the Cold War to a close (see Reynolds 2014:16).

However, since the 1970s, the practice of "institutionalized summits" has developed, at which groups of national leaders meet with a huge amount of bureaucracy. Unlike earlier summits-which were more like summit talks between hostile parties-today's institutionalized summits are more like gatherings of allies (cf. Reynolds 2014:18).

In the 1970s, the G-7 summits began as a response to the Western economic crisis, but less in the sense of crisis management like earlier summits, but as "regular coordination of policy," that is, with the goal of reaching regular agreements and understandings (Reynolds 2014:18).

The successful summit meeting of the political leadership of the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and Italy on November 15-17, 1975, in Rambouillet, southwest of Paris, was followed by another meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in June 1976.

At the urging of the United States, Canada was now also invited, forming the Group of 7 (G-7). At another meeting in London in 1977, it was decided to hold the G-7 summits annually in the future (see Reynolds 2014:20). At the May 1998 summit, Russia participated for the first time, making the summit the G-8 (cf. Reynolds 2014:21).

The following table lists all G-7 and G-8 meetings up to 2013:

Table 2.2 G7 and G8 summits (1975–2013)

Early G7 summits		Later G7 summits		G8 summits	
1975	Rambouillet	1983	Williamsburg	1998	Birmingham
1976	Puerto Rico	1984	London II	1999	Cologne
1977	London I	1985	Bonn II	2000	Okinawa
1978	Bonn I	1986	Tokyo II	2001	Genoa
1979	Tokyo I	1987	Venice II	2002	Kananaskis
1980	Venice I	1988	Toronto	2003	Evian
1981	Ottawa	1989	Paris	2004	Sea Island
1982	Versailles	1990	Houston	2005	Gleneagles
		1991	London III	2006	St Petersburg
		1992	Munich	2007	Heiligendamm
		1993	Tokyo III	2008	Hokkaido
		1994	Naples	2009	L'Aquila
		1995	Halifax	2010	Muskoka
		1996	Lyon	2011	Deauville
		1997	Denver	2012	Camp David
				2013	Lough Erne

Note
The host of the G7 summit rotated annually, always in the following order: France, US UK, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada. When Russia began chairing G8 summits, it was inserted before Germany

Source: Bayne 2014:37.

But what were the results of these summits? Core topics of the first summits were monetary economics and finance, macroeconomic issues, international trade, and energy issues (see Bayne 2014:26-29). Additional topics included North-South relations, economic relations between West and East, and individual political issues such as flight, terrorism, and kidnapping (Bayne 2014:29/30

The following list compiles the topics and "performance" of each meeting:

Table 2.1 G7 summits and their performance (1975–83)

Year	Summit site	Achievements	Grade
1975	Rambouillet	Monetary reform	A–
1976	Puerto Rico	Nothing significant	D
1977	London I	Trade, growth, nuclear power	B–
1978	Bonn I	Growth, energy, trade	A
1979	Tokyo I	Energy	B+
1980	Venice I	Afghanistan, energy	C+
1981	Ottawa	Trade ministers' quadrilateral	C
1982	Versailles	East–West trade, surveillance	C
1983	Williamsburg	Euromissiles	B

Source: Bayne (2005), Table 2.1, adapted from Putnam and Bayne (1987), Table 11.1

Source: Bayne 2014:26.

One of the criticisms of the G-7/G-8 summits was that the political leaders came, made their statements, and no one took them seriously. Bayne (2014:36), however, points out that the summits also created space for spontaneous contacts and exchanges of views above all. However, the lists of topics became longer and longer and the results of earlier summits were often neglected. Bayne (2014:36) also complains that once the summits were concluded, the assembled leaders no longer felt bound by their promises and these had hardly any organizational consequences, which is why the reputation of the G-7 and G-8 summits suffered serious damage.

The G-7 and G-8 meetings needed considerable preparation, especially of an organizational nature. However, the summits do not have a permanent secretariat, which is why Mourlon-Duol (2014:64) titled his article on the G-7 summits, "Less than a permanent secretariat, more than an ad hoc preparatory group."

In March 2014, at the instigation of U.S. President Obama, the political leaders of the G-8 group decided to suspend Russia's membership in the G-8 as a result of the Ukraine conflict and due to the occupation of Crimea (see http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/24/politics/obama-europe-trip/) . The White House wrote in a statement: "International law prohibits the acquisition of part or all of another state's territory through coercion or force. To do so violates the principles upon which the international system is built. We condemn the illegal referendum held in Crimea in violation of Ukraine's constitution."

In 2000, the idea of a G-20 summit emerged (see Bayne 2014:24). These were supposed to discard the earlier weaknesses of the G-7 and G-8 summits. However, the G-20 summit is more hierarchically organized-including finance ministers-and the summits' earlier distance from international organizations has largely been overcome. For example, today the G-20 works closely with the International Monetary Fund IMF (see Bayne 2014:36).

By 2004, the G-20 had established itself in the global governance architecture. According to Kriton (2013:175), it has proven that it can successfully address important financial issues and larger, more complex issues such as terrorism, financial crimes, trade, development, and energy issues - Kriton (2013:175) even refers to it as "regulating" ("govern"), but this may be exaggerated or even euphemistic. Leaving aside the fact that the G-20 does not include important middle-ranking countries (such as Switzerland in terms of financial issues, Nigeria as the most populous country in Africa, Iran as a regional power, or Egypt as an important country in the Middle East), it is obvious that the G-20 structure - just like the G-7 already - amounts to imposing its kind of rules or even world order on the politically or economically weaker and poorer countries. To put it somewhat wickedly, one could also speak of a New Kind of Cooperative Hegemonialism of the Rich and Powerful.

There is no doubt that today the G-7 and G-20 groups are part of the global governance architecture (see Kriton 2013:263). However, it remains to be seen how sustainable this actually is in political or economic crises in which the members have different interests. The exclusion - at least temporarily - of the Russian Federation from the G-8 group gives rise to skepticism. In any case, the G-20 is not a democratic body, or even a body of democratic states, as China's or Saudi Arabia's membership proves.

2.4   Transnational Hybridizations

Gunnar Schuppert (2014:373/374) has proposed to speak of a "hybrid governance" type. He distinguished between legal, organizational-institutional and functional hybridization tendencies. By legal hybridization, Schuppert (2014:374) understands regulatory structures that enable the interaction of state and private agency, such as state concessions for the exploitation of mineral resources. By organizational-institutional hybridization, Schuppert

(2014:377) means an "interlocking of the public and private sectors in the mirror of new organizational models." Probably the most famous example of this would be the East Indian Company, which was "half enterprise, half sovereign" (Schuppert 2014:379) and acted as both a state power and a commercial enterprise. A more recent example of organizational-institutional hybridization would be the Private Public Partnerships PPP, which have been practiced for some years now and, although they have not taken on a legal form of their own, certainly have a hybrid character at the interface of private corporate activity and state tasks. Finally, according to Schuppert (2014:381), one can speak of functional hybridization when "the 'deed contributions' to globalization of the various actors ... complement or substitute each other." These complementarities are often informal, exhibit a wide range of differences, and not infrequently lead to overlaps. Examples would be the development of standards in environmental management or in education.

2.5   Experiences with global governance and critical conclusion.

Miranda A. Schreurs (2012:217) has pointed out that international agreements-in her example on environmental issues-can promote global awareness, strengthen global norms, and also lead to some consensus on action among states. However, it has proven difficult to achieve further cooperation on issues such as climate protection. In this regard, the author emphasizes that "some of the most innovative developments toward sustainability have come from states and local governments" (Schreurs 2012:218; translation from English by CJ).

In summary, the global governance discussion can be understood on a continuum between hierarchical global structure (hegemonic world state) and a - more or less unregulated - international anarchic system, with the different forms of global governance somewhere in between these two extremes.

The table below represents this continuum on the horizontal plane (theory of structure), where "Hierarchy" and "Anarchy" stand for the two extreme positions, while "Polity" is somewhere in between. Actually, one would have to name - as a fourth position on the horizontal level, so to speak - a reinforcement of global polity, for instance in the form of a

democratic world state. In this context, the right-hand column ("Polity") on Corry's (2013:99) table below can be concretized either in the form of "global governance" in the sense discussed here or in the form of a democratic world state (cf. ► Unit D 43: "The Missing World State"):

Table 4.1   Structural models compared

Variables	Political systems with different structures (units that interact enough to have to take each other's actions into account)		
Theory of structure	**Hierarchy**	**Anarchy**	**Polity**
Constitutive feature	Existence of a sovereign	Absence of sovereign power and absence of common governance-object	Existence of a common governance-object
Ordering principle	Super- and subordination between subjects	Coordination between subjects	Identification with governance-object
Organization of political space	Vertical	Polar	Concentric
Principle of membership	Centralized inclusion/exclusion	Systemic mutual recognition	Decentralized identification
Dimensions of variation	Hierarchical–egalitarian	Uni-polar–multipolar	Dense – thin/stable-unstable/antagonistic-harmonious identification

Source: Corry 2013:99.

If global governance is understood as a kind of consensus arrangement by states and non-state actors (cf. Graz/Nölke 2012:129), a kind of "relational view of power" is associated with it. Graz and Nölke (2012:129) therefore believe that governance - at least on a transnational or global level - should be understood as a combination of consensus and coercion. However, it should be objected with Gramsci that power always has a hegemonic aspect, i.e. a kind of "social dominance" of one population group over others (cf. Graz/Nölke 2012:129). If this is so, the governance concept suffers from the fact that it is never quite clear where the fault line between (voluntary) consensus and enforced enforcement lies - and that, accordingly, there can be no fixed rules of the game, because power sharing is always a consequence of a negotiated balance of power. Of course, this is also the case in a state, only there, negotiation processes are predetermined by higher-level procedures and rules (elections, votes, etc.), transparent and stable over time (constitution, laws, etc.). None of this applies to global governance. This either degenerates into an "anything goes" approach

or individual - state or private - actors become so powerful that they can regulate things largely "in their own way."

Individual representatives of the global governance concept have emphasized that this type of "government" is "informal" and "non-hierarchical." However, Graz and Nölke (2012:130) rightly object that these actors need a kind of "slipstream of hierarchy" ("shadow of hierarchy") to be effective. Therefore, it makes little sense to see the logic of governance as informal and non-hierarchical, because governance sets in motion a logic that creates new channels between formal and non-formal procedures and processes, as well as hierarchical and non-hierarchical social mechanisms (Graz/Nölke 2012:123). Thus, Graz/Nölke (2012:136) conclude that global governance in the sense of "transnational private governance" is neither so transnational, nor so private, nor so close to the ideal of "good governance" as many observers like to claim.

In other words: Global governance as consensus-oriented power sharing between state and non-state actors is only the disguise of indirect and network-like power structures, which, however, are not subject to any democratic control and, moreover, are completely non-transparent.

One could also say: what is needed is a construction of a clear, transparent and democratic framework for action for all actors - state or private - on an inter- and transnational level. Neumann (2012:256) speaks in this context - and as a conclusion of an extensive and critical discussion volume on global governance - of the need for an "emerging global polity" and of the importance of "governance as a guiding, steering capacity" ("steering capacity") that clearly goes beyond existing concepts and practices of global governance. And Corry (2013:184) speaks of building a "global polity".

3. Control Questions

1.   What are the main differences between the handling of international affairs and national governments?

2. In what sense has the view of international relations shifted in recent years according to Neyer?

3. What four models of world order did Neyer describe and how do they differ?

4. What three models of global democracy did Archibugi et al. distinguish?

5. Why is the concept of "stakeholder democracy" problematic?

6. How did Arndt define "governance"?

7. How does Bevir distinguish "governance" from "government"?

8. How does Hidalgo define "global governance"?

9. What do Braml et al. mean by "global governance"?

10. According to Trute, which questions are at the center of governance research?

11. Which three approaches to governance can be distinguished according to Andt?

12. What is the central point of global governance according to Mouffe?

13. According to Dahl and Moffe, why are international organizations not democracies?

14. To what extent is the global governance approach not so much a new, but rather a refined way of describing how international conflicts are dealt with?

15. What is the evidence that the world is unlikely to avoid a world state in the long run?

16. What does the reproach against global government mean, that it is "a strangely subjectless form of governance," and what counterarguments does Schuppert give to this?

17. What is the objection to Schuppert's argumentation?

18. Which two modes - i.e. types of functioning - of the capitalist market economy do Willke and Willke name?

19. According to Busch and Jörgens, what is needed in order to use diffusion processes for global governance?

20. What are the G-7/G-8/G-20 and which countries belong(ed) to them?

21. Which issues and topics did the G-7/G-8 summits deal with?

22. What does Schuppert mean by transnational hybridization?

23. Why is the labeling of global governance as "informal" and "non-hierarchical" according to Graz and Nölke problematic?

4. Links

Global Governance
http://reset.org/knowledge/global-governance

Global Governance Institute
http://www.globalgovernance.eu/

Global Governance aus der Sicht der WTO
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl220_e.htm

Global governance: Old and new challenges
Von Balakrishnan Rajagopal
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RTDBook/PartIIChapter13.pdf

U.S., other powers kick Russia out of G8
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/24/politics/obama-europe-trip/

G-20-Gipfel: Organisatorisches
https://g20.org/

List of G-20-Summits
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_G-20_summits

5. Cited literature and further reading

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