

Unit D 43: The missing world state

1. Summary

In response to global and transnational problems, a wide variety of supranational and worldwide solutions for peacekeeping have been proposed. Due to the intensive interdependence of nation states and also as a result of the still increasing globalization, renowned scientists, politicians and philosophers have again increasingly brought the idea of a world state into the discussion in recent years. The idea of a world state goes far beyond the concept of global governance (see ► Unit D 42: "Global Governance") and is also the subject of controversial debate.

2 Peace and democracy

Norberto Bobbio (1995:17/18) has posed the dual question of whether it is possible to have an international democratic state system composed of autocratic or authoritarian states and whether it is possible to have an international autocratic state system of democratic states. Bobbio answered both questions in the negative (see Archibugi/Held 1995:9 as well as Bobbio 1995:17-41). He did so by arguing that the different nature of autocratic and democratic states also followed different logics.

Wossen Aregay (2014:54/55) has rightly pointed out that constitutions, and thus states, are never simply retrospective in nature, but are also visionary, i.e., directed toward the future: "In the demos, power relations are not the result of tradition and habit - one designs state and society. The constitution is thus a fundamental document, which designs the public order together with society. In this respect, the constitution has a formative character". And, "The constitution is the means by which change is enacted or advanced" (Aregay 2014:55). However, it is always also a question for which purpose someone invokes a constitution: either to defend handed-down prerogatives or particular interests - conservative position - or to justify sociopolitical changes - reform-oriented to revolutionary position.

This applies not only to national states, but to any kind of public state, i.e. also at the world level. World orders can be established or aspired to for idealistic reasons - that is, reasons oriented toward the common good - or for particular or self-interests.

2.1 Responsibility of the World Community and Humanity


In connection with the Islamic terror in Syria and Iraq in 2014, Johannes Rösler wrote (in *Christ in der Gegenwart* of October 2014:2): "In an emergency, there is not only a military responsibility of the international community to protect against genocide, but also a spiritual one". What is meant by this is that excessive military action - against terrorist organizations, for example - can miss the real problem, which is the sustainable establishment of a world peace that does not allow or at least tries to reduce extremist and appropriating ways of acting, as well as social, political and economic injustice.

Another aspect is the worldwide demographic development. The greatest population growth is taking place, of all places, in those areas of the world that are struggling the most with terror - and where reliable nation-state institutions are often lacking, for example in Africa and to some extent in Central Asia (cf. also Weisflog in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Oct. 25, 2016:12).

It should not be forgotten that the world's population - that is, all of humanity - is also an acting political subject. That is why Raffaele Marchetti (2012:22) put at the beginning of his article on models of global democracy the very justified question: "Which demos for (global) democracy?"

2.2 Intertwined statehood

Based on reflections on the global governance approach (cf. in detail ► Unit D 42: "Global Governance"), Schuppert (2014:28) suggested "gaining our own observation perspective from which we succeed in recognizing and describing basic structures, constellations, and repeating patterns of changing statehood. In order to also be able to name this specific observation perspective, we propose the concept of intertwined statehood" (Schuppert 2014:28). With this, Schuppert (2014:28) wanted to point out, among other things, "that the actor state rarely gets along without society." As a rule, this is a form of imposing society, but there are also commercial or religious "entrepreneurs" who seek state protection. Schuppert (2014:31) lists the following interlocking structures:



In this account, it is striking that the state is only one actor - albeit a central one - among other actors. Seen in this light, this view resembles Luhmann's vision of social subsystems interacting with each other (cf. Luhmann 1984; for a detailed discussion of systems theory, cf. ► Unit I 8: "Systems Theory").

Growing international activity by more and more actors means that the complexity of exchange and production relationships increases, which automatically leads to more uncertainty that opens up opportunities but also increases risks. If internationally active companies or organizations cannot rely on the fact that laws are respected, that everyone is treated equally or that their property is protected, planned activity is hardly possible anymore - let alone successful, sustainable and ethically correct activity.

Schuppert (2014:232) has used the example of international norm developments of financial institutions to show how the growing international interdependence increasingly calls for a condensation of regulatory mechanisms:




Source: Schuppert 2014:232.

According to Schuppert 2014:232, the increasing interconnectedness is also reflected in "a spreading culture (or unculture, cf. Frey 2008) of ratings and rankings ..., i.e. of processes of measuring and evaluating that cover virtually all subject areas". And measuring and rating naturally only makes sense if the institutions measured and rated can be compared with each other - and if necessary replaced by each other. And that, in turn, is only possible if there is a corresponding common framework of reference and action, for example in the form of an international market or a global action area.

At the same time, a growing number of international institutions can be observed in the past decades, but also an independence and an increase in authority of these very institutions (cf. Schuppert 2014:234). However, it should not be forgotten that more authority does not necessarily mean more legitimacy. All the more so, as - as Zürn (2011:619) argues - "the new international regulations intervene deeply in domestic affairs and thus undermine the consensus principle of international politics and the logic of state sovereignty." This explains the recent rise of populist movements, for example in Switzerland (SVP) or in Great Britain (UKIP), which are increasingly directed against international regulations and institutions, such as the popular initiative "Swiss law instead of foreign judges" launched by the SVP in Switzerland (cf. Auer in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 13, 2015:19), which is directed against democracy in the name of democracy (dismantling individual human and fundamental rights

under the slogan "Federal Constitution before international law," or against the European Convention on Human Rights), or in Great Britain against institutions of the European Union.

At the international political level, therefore, the following mechanism of action can be identified:



Source: Schuppert 2014:242.

2.3 The idea of a democratic world state

Jürg Neyer (2013:216/217) has pointed out that the idea of a democratic world state originally comes from Kant.

Immanuel Kant (2011:25), in his 1796 paper "On Perpetual Peace," described the "League of Nations" as a logical form of peaceful coexistence of states, although this "League of Nations" would "not have to be a state of nations" (Kant 2011:25). Kant then argues further that - if there is no "supreme legislative, governing and judging power" (Kant 2011:28) above the states - it is not possible to see on what the trust in a peaceful coexistence of states and peoples can then be based. Therefore it is valid:

Kant's World State

"For states, in relation to each other, there can be no other way, according to reason, to get out of the lawless state, which contains only war, than that they, just like individual human beings, give up their wild (lawless) liberty, get comfortable with public compulsory laws, and thus form a (admittedly always growing) state of nations (civitas gentium), which would finally deal with all the nations of the earth."

Source: Kant 2011: 28/29, Second Article of Definition. Cf. also Neyer 2013:217.

As a - negative - surrogate for such a "world republic" (Kant 2011:29), there could only be a "war-defending, existing, and ever-expanding federation..." [there] could only be a "federation, existing, and always spreading, to ward off war", which "could stem the flow of right-shying, hostile inclinations, but with a constant danger of their outbreak" (Kant 2011:29). So Kant calls for a world state to overcome the constant danger of war.

Eberl and Niesen (in Kant 2011:347) have pointed out that there are three positions in Kant scholarship: In these, Kant is seen, depending on the case, as a representative of the world-state idea, as a representative of a treaty-of-states concept, or - in between, so to speak - as a representative of a loose league of nations. Thus, Höffe (1999:259) held that Kant preferred the League of Nations without political power to the world republic because he believed in the peacefulness of republics (cf. Eberl/Niesen in Kant 2011:348).

According to Otfried Höffe (1999:59, cf. also Neyer 2013:218), the establishment of a world state is morally imperative because only such a global state is able to redeem legal formality and grants a "legal form of coexistence." Wherever people meet - and this is ultimately the case all over the world - "arbitrariness and violence are to be replaced by rules ('universal commandment of law'), the rules are to be entrusted to public powers ('universal commandment of state'), and the powers are to be shaped as qualified democracy ('universal commandment of democracy')" (Höffe 1999:267)".

According to Höffe (1999, cf. also Neyer 2013:218), such a world state would have three tasks: First, it must transform indeterminate legal norms ("principles") into binding legal norms ("rules"). Second, the rule of law must apply these legal rules in administration and

jurisdiction. And third, the world state is responsible for enforcing legal obligations ("coercive capacity," cf. Höffe 1999:97-100).

According to Höffe (1999:59), securing individual rights requires a "normative set of rules," a "universally valid social grammar." This "rule of rules" (Höffe 1999:59) is the only guarantee against the social Darwinist rule and right of the strongest. The superior system of rules guarantees justice: "Instead of individual arbitrariness, including passions such as envy, jealousy, vindictiveness, even malice, and likewise instead of individual violence, be it of a physical, emotional or intellectual nature, there prevails that strict commonality in which every majority finds itself united with every minority: the rule. Neutral against minorities and majorities, the rule is the impartial third party par excellence and thus the expression of justice".

In this context, a world state would be necessary "not in place of the individual states, but solely to complement them" (Höffe 2002a:21) in the sense of the principle of subsidiarity. The world republic would be responsible for two areas: On the interstate, "international law" side for the "legal coexistence of states" (Höffe 2002a:21) and on the "cosmopolitan" side for the "legal coexistence of non-state subjects" (Höffe 2002a:21). In this context, Höffe (2002a:22) saw three strategies for a legitimation of a world state: first, from the entire world population as "state people" of a "world republic", second, by all included individual states in the form of an exclusive state legitimation, and third, by a combined legitimation by both the world population and all individual states. Höffe gives preference to the third strategy: a combined legitimation by citizens and states: "Within the framework of treaty theory, this corresponds to a twofold world state or world democracy treaty. It takes up the two dimensions of international law: On the one hand, in the 'international law' social contract, the world republic justifies itself from the individual states, on the other hand, in the 'cosmopolitan' social contract, from the individual citizens. This 'world republican double contract' results in that more complex concept of popular sovereignty which we know from the principle of federalism: All power of the world republic emanates from its double state people, from the community of all people and that of all states. The secondary and subsidiary world state is thus additionally a federal unit: a world federal state" (Höffe 2002a:22/23).

Accordingly, this double legitimation would have to be reflected organizationally in a bicameral system, i.e. a world parliament in the form of two chambers: a parliamentary chamber as "citizens' chamber" and a parliamentary chamber as "states' chamber" (Höffe 2002a:24).

What many people do not know is that even the former head of the Roman Catholic Church, Paul VI, had already addressed the problem of a (missing) world government in his encyclical *Populorum Progressio* in 1967. In it, Paul VI quoted from his speech to the United Nations in New York in 1965: "Who does not see the necessity of gradually arriving at the establishment of an authority that embraces the world and is capable of acting effectively on the legal as well as on the political level" (PP 78).

2.4 Arguments pro and contra world state

Jean L. Cohen (2012:81) suggested that the idea of a world state is objectionable on both normative and pragmatic grounds. In contrast, Otfried Höffe (2002a) argues for a world state in the form of a world republic from a legal ethics perspective:

According to Höffe (2002a:24-31), six objections in particular are raised against a world republic:

Objection 1: A world state is - as Kant already put it - "a monster which cannot be governed at all because of its size and lack of clarity" (Höffe 2002a:24).

Counterargument

"Indeed, for Liechtenstein - 28,500 inhabitants - Switzerland, with six and a half million, is huge, and the United States, with 250 million, is a behemoth, not to mention India - 950 million - and China: 1.3 billion inhabitants. But when a polity like the United States, almost ten thousand times the size of Liechtenstein and still almost forty times the size of Switzerland, nevertheless allows itself to be governed, the first objection may have some merit. But it is not a convincing argument, one that deals the death blow to the idea of a world republic."

Source: Höffe 2002a:24.

Objection 2: A world republic would jeopardize the great civilizational achievement of human rights and civil liberties, because so far only the individual state has succeeded in enforcing and protecting these rights.

Counterargument

"Where human and civil rights are already protected, partly domestically, partly by large-regional human rights conventions based on the European model, a world republic can hold back. But in the case of massive human rights violations, up to and including genocide, restraint can only be warranted if the intervention, the so-called humanitarian intervention, does not cause even more mischief; it is not justified in principle."

Source: Höffe 2002a:25.

Objection 3: There is a simpler means for the protection of human rights, namely the democratization of all nation states. It would be enough to pursue a policy of democratization of all states, and a world republic would thus become superfluous (cf. Höffe 2002a:27).

Counterargument

It is not necessarily true that democracies are always peace-loving. The French Republic, for example, overran Europe with war and also pursued colonial interests. Democratic England, after all, built a world colonial empire that encompassed a quarter of the world. And also the USA spread out in North America against the legitimate interests of the native peoples - and pursued for decades an imperialistic policy among other things with secret service methods or military interventions, in the context of which democratic governments were overthrown again and again like 1953 the government Mossadegh in Iran, 1954 the government Arbenz in Guatemala and 1971 the elected government Allende in Chile etc.. Or they staged assassinations or violent incidents to be able to start a war, such as in the 19th century the assassination carried out by an American agent on Feb. 15, 1898 against the U.S. warship Maine to legitimize the war against Spain, or the Tonkin Incident in 1964 against Vietnam, which became the prelude to the Vietnam War, etc. Democracies are not immune to imperialist policies.

Objection 4: The establishment of a world state requires a sense of justice common to all people, a world consciousness of justice (Höffe 2002a:29).

Counterargument

"World law consciousness still needs time to develop; however, the existing commonalities are already strong enough to make world courts possible: the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, International War Tribunals, and the World Criminal Court."

Source: Höffe 2002a:29.

Objection 5: Because there is a threat of leveling in the age of globalization, there is a need today to strengthen particularisms and specificities (cf. Höffe 2002a:29). This is the only way to preserve cultural diversity and the identity of people bound to it.

Counterargument

Although people have a moral right to "particular universalisms" such as "history and tradition, religion, language and culture" - i.e. the communitarian argument - the existing states are not an end in themselves, but political units that can also be transformed into larger or smaller units, depending on the wishes of the citizens, and furthermore, "the universal law, state and democracy demands ... to submit to the requirements of liberal democracy on the one hand, and to establish a global legal and state order in a complementary way on the other hand."

Source: Höffe 2002a:29.

Objection 6: There are no signs that a federal world republic is even beginning to emerge.

Counterargument

Supranational alliances and institutions such as the European Union - which certainly serves as a model for other regions of the world - but also international networks and international courts of justice very much form the first beginnings of a world republic.

Höffe (e.g. 2002a:25) repeatedly emphasizes that the principle of world-state subsidiarity has two sides: "On the one hand, the world republic is not to be decreed from above, but is to be built democratically, from the citizens and the individual states. On the other hand, only residual tasks remain for the federal world republic. The federal republic is at the same time a complementary world republic, not replacing the individual states, but supplementing them" (Höffe 2002a:25).

Another problem is the regulation of international markets. Bohmann (2002:101) rightly writes: "Markets have traditionally been regulated in two ways: they can be regulated by mandatory law, such as when governments mitigate market failures or mandate that

economic actors control impacts such as pollution. Or they can be regulated by the market's own laws, as in the macroeconomic policies of restricting the money supply, incentive-based policies such as pollution credits, etc. Both mechanisms presuppose a certain variety of political institutions with centralized authority..." (Bohmann 2002:101). The problem, however, is that today more and more markets function internationally, such as many areas of finance (credit markets, investments, structured products, etc.), international trade in goods and services, and even the labor market. Quite a few of today's problems stem from the fact that these international markets are not or can only be poorly regulated, either because there is no relevant binding international law or because no international institution has the authority and the means and instruments to undertake monetary controls, currency targeting, etc. Both could only be done by a world state institution, or by institutions acting in its name and on its behalf, but also with its backing - like a national bank acting on behalf of a nation state.

The real antithesis to a democratic world state lies in the hegemonic superpowers. In this context, Höffe (2004:201) speaks of a "double standard" and of a "hegemonic pressure" on the further development of international law and international criminal justice, especially by boycotting the World Criminal Court: "While almost all states of the world signed the founding treaty [of the World Criminal Court], Israel, Japan, and above all the United States tried to prevent it by almost all means" (Höffe 2004:201). To this day, the United States refuses to submit its citizens, and especially its soldiers, to the World Criminal Court-which, after all, is supposed to punish genocide (genocide), crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes, among other things. Höffe points out that the U.S. reservation is first of all factually wrong: The U.S. reservation that measures against serious human rights violations cannot be avoided in war does not affect the World Court, because "the military response to the most serious human rights violations is not an offense in the sense of the new World Criminal Court; only a clearly 'disproportionate' reaction is worthy of punishment" (Höffe 2004:202). The problem is probably rather that individual states - and, astonishingly, democracies in particular - do not want to let the possibility of a hegemonic policy be taken away.

In the discussion of "sovereign regional mega-states" (Cohen 2012:81) and a world state, Cohen (2012:81) sees three debates: first, the concept of an empire or new "imperial formations" as an analytical, descriptive, or prognostic category; second, the discussion of "global governance to the concept of a cosmopolitan multileveled world order and a normative ideal of a cosmopolitan constitution" (Cohen 2012:81); and third, the resurgence of a federal vision. All three approaches address recent developments related to globalization and imply elements of a framework for a public law that governs government and governance.

Jürgen Habermas (2005:331) has called for designing a "conceptual alternative to the world republic and its contemporary variants." He proposed three conceptual rearrangements for this purpose: First, the concept of state sovereignty had to be adapted "to the new forms of governance beyond the nation-state" (Habermas 2005:33); second, the conceptual connection between the state's monopoly on the use of force and mandatory law had to be revised and replaced by the sanctionability of supranational law; and third, mechanisms had to be developed for nations to change their self-understanding. In doing so, Habermas - in a clear weakening of the world-state and world-republic idea - wants a "new structure of a constituted world civil society to be created by three arenas with three kinds of collective actors" (Habermas 2005:334): **At the top level** ("supranational arena"), **a world organization without a state character** would be the sole actor; **at the second level**, there would be **transnational networks and organizations** as overlapping actors of a state and non-state nature, more or less coordinating themselves; and **at the third level**, there would be **nation-states** as actors (Habermas 2005:334-377). Apart from the fact that this vision hardly exceeds today's real situation, it does not solve any of the existing problems, such as regions without a monopoly on the use of force due to weak, absent or dissolving nation-states.

It would be more honest to speak out against a world state.

Daniele Archibugi (2003:7) has pointed out a fundamental misunderstanding that he attributes to the federalist tradition: Many people, he argues, believe that a cosmopolitan democracy-and thus also a democratic world state-would lead to a dissolution of nation-states or even make such a dissolution imperative. But newer ideas assume that local

administrative units and national state structures will continue to exist and are necessary in the sense of subsidiarity even under a democratic world state. They simply surrender part of their sovereign rights to the superordinate democratic world state, similar to the way provinces, states or cantons surrender part of their sovereignty to the national government.

As early as the 1930s, Carl Schmitt (1932:45) put forward the thesis-which has been taken up again in the 21st century by Chantal Mouffe (cf. Mouffe 2007:22ff.)-that a "world state" that would encompass the entire earth and all of humanity would not constitute or represent a political entity and thus could not be understood as an actual state. It would lack the friend-foe relationship of political opposites necessary for a state (cf. ► Unit D 18: "State and Religion Today"). Such a world state would not form a "unity" - similar to the inhabitants of a tenement or the purchasers of gas by a gasworks: As long as a world unity would remain only economic or transport-related, it could not be more than a more or less thrown together bunch of individuals or institutions. From today's point of view, however, it must be countered that, on the one hand, this is the case today, and, on the other hand, approaches such as global governance represent only more or less desperate attempts at a not quite so anarchic coordination on a supranational level.

Oliver Hidalgo (2014:471) has pointed out an interesting problem: He sees a tension between individual universal rights and "collective particular identities" - i.e., for instance, between globally valid fundamental rights for every human being and specific national forms of these fundamental rights, leaving open whether a world state could be organized similarly to a nation state. Among other things, this is because a conflict between nation-states, which today is carried out externally, would become a (world-)internal conflict. However, this question seems to be a bit far-fetched, since already today conflicts within states - such as autonomy or secessionist aspirations - are fought out and often solved within states, as the Jura conflict in Switzerland showed. The fact that today efforts for more autonomy or secession involve external actors tends to increase the virulence of these conflicts and has a conflict-escalating effect, because there is always the threat of secession, as the example of eastern Ukraine showed in 2014. If, however, the conflict remains internal, all parties are quite simply forced to seek some form of modus vivendi or, better, conflict resolution.

It seems to me that another danger is greater in the case of a world state: If a possible world state has to intervene again and again in a large number of places, it runs the risk of being increasingly perceived by local population groups as an occupying power. This would lead to a situation similar to that in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein or in Afghanistan after the victory over the Taliban. Therefore, an intervening world state would always have to provide political reconstruction assistance, for which it would be much better legitimized than a great power today - and in which it would also have a greater interest, because the area in question is not simply "occupied territory" but part of its own (world) state.

The central task of a democratic world state would be **to establish a global economic order** whose architecture, in the sense of Koch (2014:138), would consist of a **global security architecture**, a **global economic architecture**, and a **global social and environmental architecture** (cf. in detail ► Unit D 22: "Political Aspects of Globalization," chapter 2.3).

2.5 The world citizen concept

Kant (2011:30) already postulated a world citizenship that was not intended to replace national citizenship but to complement it (cf. Höffe 1999:259). However, Kant's Weltbürgerrecht "in relation to foreign states ... included a right to visit, not a right to be a guest. ... Everyone may knock elsewhere, but has no right of admission" (Höffe 1999:259). Kant's world citizenship was thus - at best - a relative one, and "restricted to the conditions of general hospitality" (Kant 2011:30).


Conversely, the four main criteria for citizenship in the liberal sense can certainly be concretized at the world level. These four principles are, **first, equal rights for all** within the political community, **second, the duty to respect all the rights of other citizens**, **third, the obligation to promote the civil rights of others and the common good**, and **fourth, active participation in political life** (cf. Dower 2014:20).

Representatives of cosmopolitan perspectives argue "that every citizen in the new millennium will have to learn to become a 'cosmopolitan citizen' as well: that is, a person capable of mediating between national traditions, communities of destiny, and alternative

lifestyles. Citizenship in a democratic form of government of the future should be capable of playing a growing investigative role: A role that involves dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of broadening the horizons of one's own basic structure of meaning and prejudice" (Held 2002:115).

2.6 Further implications

As we have seen, the longer the nation-states, the more they have reached their limits. On the political level, the logical response is to establish a democratic world state on a subsidiary basis (for a detailed discussion of a democratic world state, see Jäggi 2016:101ff). This means a bottom-up partial delegation of power - and at the same time a globally legitimized power in certain areas. This results in a power pyramid that looks as follows:



The great obstacle to the establishment of a democratic world state lies in the fact that many people (and nation states) distrust a concentration of power in a world government. Fear of the loss of sovereignty by national governments is so widespread that, for example, even the unique project of a European Union built on democracy and peace has aroused ever greater mistrust - and even led to Britain's withdrawal. This is likely to be even more true for a world government.

However, there are two serious objections to this: First, there had been the same objections to a national central government in every single federal state, for example in the USA or in Switzerland. But there is no reason to believe that what works at the national level - namely, a democratic division of power and authority between the central government and local governments - cannot and will not work at the global level.

The second objection is more fundamental: Who can guarantee that a world state will not be instrumentalized and exploited by individual forces, groups or persons to advance their own special interests, just as certain nation states are today?

2.7 Ethics in politics as sine qua non

It is obvious: Every state - whether a secular democracy or a theocracy - functions only as long as the political leadership adheres to ethical-normative values and the political leaders have some personal integrity. Unfortunately, this is not the case today - and was not the case in earlier times either, as we know from history. Personal interests, the desire for power, the greed for wealth are unfortunately widespread in almost all governments today. In times of fake news, the arbitrariness of social networks and the mania for omnipotence, the ethical question - and especially the question of personal ethics - has become crucial.

But it is not enough to pursue a purely utilitarian ethic - along the lines of: what benefits us most? Rather, the question arises as to what is meant by "us": me and my next of kin, my political party, my country, or all of humanity?

There is a need for a permanent discourse about what "ethical politics" could be and according to which criteria state agencies, the economy and governments have to orient themselves. The time of "politics without ethics" is over, and so is the time when ethics was only practiced behind closed doors by a select academic audience.

Ethical issues arise at several levels:

First, it must be clarified **which basic ethical principles** must be **decisive for political decisions**: Principle of merit or principle of solidarity; principle of justice or unrestricted individual freedom; self-interest or overall good?

Second, only **people who have a minimum of personal integrity** should be **elected to leading political positions**. The big problem, of course, is that personal integrity can neither be measured nor certified. Moreover, it only becomes apparent in the course of holding political office, i.e. ex post - and even that is often not recognizable to third parties. But voters should at least pay more attention to whether a politician preaches water and drinks wine - politically, economically and also privately.

Third, through **improved political-ethical education**, all people should be enabled to understand the implications of political decisions, to think in a differentiated way, and to recognize demagogic or ideological incitement as well as prejudice or lies.

2.8 A New Virtue Ethics in Politics?

This raises the question of whether ethical behavior can be learned.

Recent developments in world politics show that both the liberal-democratic state model and the god-state model have reached their limits. Democracies are in danger of sliding into purely arithmetical majority-minority constellations at the loss of their own value base, while states of God, which invoke religious orders of salvation, are increasingly turning out to be dictatorships and are also losing their own value base.

Both face the problem that they want to secure peace - their peace! - but in fact cause more and more violence, war and misery.

International politics - and especially today's forms of military interventionism, armed rebellion and markets of violence - faces the compelling need to find new rules of the game that do not put hatred, mistrust, fear and violence at the center, but see trust, acceptance and promotion of diversity as well as non-violent negotiation mechanisms as the supporting and exclusive foundations of conflict management.

At the same time, an increased ethical orientation of all people, and especially of all politicians, is essential.

It is probably no coincidence that in recent years virtue-ethical ideas have again found increased acceptance in ethical discourse. In contrast to Europe-where questions of virtue ethics met with little response for many years, especially in moral theology and in German-language Protestant ethics (cf. Merkl 2015:39)-there is a long-standing and lively debate in the United States about the question of virtues and virtue ethics. In particular, the discussions conducted within the framework of "virtue ethics" indicate that the concept of virtue is used in the Anglo-Saxon language area in a "more unencumbered way than in German" (Schockenhoff 2014:80, cf. also Merkl 2015:38).

In contrast to ethical concepts, which - such as questions of "applied ethics" - are usually "act-centered," that is, act- or action-centered, virtue ethics can be understood as "agent-centered" (Horn 2016:155), that is, actor-centered. In this context, virtue ethics usually emphasizes the importance of personal role models (cf. Horn 2016:155). In doing so, virtue ethics starts from the fundamental question, "What kind of person do I want to be?" (Horn 2016:156).

Virtue ethics approaches are based on two important premises: First, virtue ethics that is to be taken seriously necessarily merges into a corresponding ethics of action and is "by no means exhausted in mere intellectual sentiment" (Merkl 2015:72). Second, "all action always follows being" and presupposes a "moral ability" (Merkl 2015:72, as well as Lawler and

Salzman 2013:457 and Schockenhoff 2014:65). In other words, "acting follows being. Speaking and acting truthfully can only be done by those who are already truthful beforehand, who face the claim of truth across the whole breadth of life" (Demmer 2003:123; see also Merkl 2015:72).

Merkl (2015:137) has raised the very legitimate question of whether virtues are not socio-cultural constructs that can vary depending on the environment and should be relativized accordingly. In other words, are the virtues not ultimately arbitrary?

As a first preliminary answer, it can be countered that essential virtues such as honesty, kindness, conciliation, solidarity and empathy can be found in (almost) all cultures - and are considered desirable and worthy of promotion by most religions. The problem, however, is that virtually all socio-cultural and religious contexts also permit, or even recommend in certain situations, acts or even attitudes of violence, rejection, defensiveness, and destruction. However - and this is the point - not as basic attitudes, but situational and related to certain people and at certain times.

Obviously, there are certain universal basic attitudes - anthropological constants, so to speak - and socio-culturally distinctive forms or variables. From this point of view, it would have to be clarified whether the central, fundamental virtues are not found interculturally and thus have an anthropogenic character. Otfried Höffe (2009:133, cf. also Merkl 2015:152f.) speaks of "subjective objectivity" in this context: "In terms of content, character virtues are open to highly diverse cultures and individuals. However, because their openness does not extend to relativistic arbitrariness, they can be said to have objectivity, which, however, is to be qualified subjectively because of the openness to the idiosyncrasies of cultures, especially also of individuals."

Virtue ethics stands or falls with the understanding of what virtue is or ought to be.

For Kant, virtue consisted of obeying moral laws. Therefore, for Kant, fortitude-as a consequence of consistent direction of action-was the central virtue, while for Plato and

Aristotle, justice and prudence were at the center of virtues (see Schockenhoff 2014:73). Still others understood virtue as a single basic attitude, namely the moral willpower of man.

Is punctuality a virtue? Is efficiency a virtue? Is politeness a virtue? Is orderliness a virtue?

As welcome as such qualities are - they still say nothing about the "morally good". "Good people" can be unpunctual, low achievers, untidy, and sometimes even rude.

Even the four classical cardinal virtues in Aristotle and their concretization by Thomas Aquinas-namely prudence/reason, justice/will, fortitude/fortitude, prudence/moderation (cf. Schockenhoff 2014:164)-and other understandings of virtue are not without problems, but they are already closer to the "ethically good." Love, solidarity, kindness, empathy, and hope go even further. Only: are they sufficient to be able to act "morally good"? One could perhaps say: They are necessary, but not yet sufficient qualities of "ethically good people".

In the modern understanding of virtue ethics, there is the norm figure and a widely shared common understanding of a "personality of integrity" (cf. Horn 2016:174). Qualities of a "personality of integrity" according to this understanding are:

- "(i) Being in harmony with oneself,
- (ii) having depth,
- (iii) reliability,
- (iv) righteousness,
- (v) strength of character" (Horn 2016:174f.).

In slightly different words, a "person of integrity" is honest, reliable, stable, and has a harmonious, coherent, stable personality. The basic problem, however, is that a person's integrity can hardly ever be judged objectively from the outside - at most indirectly through his actions, or through the congruence of his actions with the convictions he holds. In contrast to the virtue ethics of the ancient Greeks, the focus is no longer on the individual design of the good life, but rather on the question of the coherence of (represented) basic attitude and action. Or as Schockenhoff (2014:60) has paraphrased it with his apt term of a "third-person ethics." This third-person ethics "judges action not from the life goals of the

acting people, but according to its conformity with certain rules, which no longer guarantee the success of individual life, but only the peaceful coexistence of citizens in the external social sphere" (Schockenhoff 2014:60). However, this is precisely where the problem lies: those who resort to a purely externally perceptible mode of behavior follow an externally prescribed ethic that is no longer sustainable enough in the event of a deep crisis. This is exactly the problem of, for example, Augustine's concept of virtue ethics, for whom virtue represented the *ars recte vivendi*, i.e., the art of living rightly, or even more pointedly: the sum of what one should do (cf. Augustine: 1979:252/253, cf. also Schockenhoff 2014:89).

Christoph Halbig (2013:317) has rightly pointed out two opposing dangers of virtue ethical approaches: On the one hand, virtue ethical claims can be set so high that they are ultimately unattainable. On the other hand, there is the danger that virtue-ethical claims are reduced to such an extent that they become pure conventionalism - in the style of: one does something because it is expected or because it is customary.

From the perspective of the social sciences, there is the additional problem that the classical concept of virtue is only conditionally compatible with sociological, psychological, or social-anthropological concepts: Is virtue a habitus, an attitude, a disposition, a competence, a skill, an acquired qualification, or even a genetically inherited disposition? This question is not new. Thomas Aquinas, for example, defined virtue as follows: "Virtue is every good quality of mind by virtue of which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us" (quoted from Merkl 2015:141). According to the classical dictum-which comes from Augustine-Thomas also paraphrases virtue as "that which makes good the one who possesses it and his work" (quoted from Merkl 2015:141). One can immediately see that these definitions of virtue mix valuation and description, which is why they are hardly useful in social science discourse. Perhaps, following Bourdieu, one could rewrite virtues as ethical and thus also as social and cultural capital. But this does not solve the problem that virtues are understood only as qualities or attitudes that are connoted - by whomever - as "desirable," in distinction from qualities that are considered "undesirable."

Following Lawler/Salzman (2013:444) and Merkl (2015:143 and 147), one can distinguish three dimensions of virtues: First, a character trait, disposition, or basic attitude; second, the

way of acting associated with it and with truth; and third, the gradualness of virtues, which - in the best case - is successively developed over time. Thus, the concept of virtue has both a static and a dynamic side and is also conative, that is, action-oriented.

Tugend is something that can be learned. Already Aristotle emphasized in his Nicomachean Ethics that whoever acts prudently becomes a prudent person; whoever often behaves bravely becomes a brave person (cf. Höffe 2009:130).

So is moral theologian Guido Perathoner (2000:48, cf. also Merkl 2015:137) right when he says: "All in all, virtue ethics seems to raise more questions than it offers answers"? On the contrary, it seems to me that the virtue concept - once aside from its centuries-old discussion and development - could form an excellent basis for the development of humanity, for the pacification of our planet, and for a new politics.

The old Aristotelian concept of virtue helps here: the virtuous person does the good not because he derives personal benefit from it or pursues a strategy to achieve a goal, but simply because it is right - or "good." Translated to politics, this means that the focus should not be on an individual personal goal (e.g., political success, power, etc.) or a political strategy, but on "doing right" for the greater good.

2.9 Politics and Ethics: The Problem of Personal Integrity

Alexander Merkl (2015:161ff.) has rightly raised the question of the relationship between virtue ethics and institutional ethics. Is it not enough - as not a few ethicists believe - to enforce clear ethical criteria in organizations - for example, through a developed compliance management in a company - and thus let the whole matter rest on its own?

Recent political developments show that this is not the case: populists such as Trump, Putin and Erdogan are masters at instrumentalizing institutions, twisting fundamental values into their opposite and presenting themselves as true defenders of democracy or liberalism. Arguably, never in the course of history - perhaps with the exception of the Third Reich - has

the absence of personal integrity and contempt for personal virtue been so devastatingly evident as in today's world.

Thus, it is hardly a coincidence that in the fundamental texts and statements of the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council - which, for example, in the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* (82; 84 and 90) emphasized the importance of international institutionalism - an increasingly stronger emphasis on individual virtues can be observed (cf. Merkl 2015:162ff.). For instance, the ethicist Dietmar Mieth (1984:10, 18, and 70) held that only on the basis of virtue ethics "something like an institutional-critical consciousness can arise at all." Yes, Mieth (1984:18) even saw in the virtues "new criteria for testing the ethical correctness of our institutions."

Merkl (2015:165) rightly called for a normative minimum standard in the form of an "interweaving and ... [an] interplay of virtue and institutional ethical moment." However, this raises the question of the extent to which institutional structures, dependencies, and mechanisms do not, as it were, mask, compensate for, or even cancel out virtue-ethical attitudes and modes of action, because institutions do not primarily follow ethical but rather organization-specific logics. Merkl (2015:166), however, rightly warns against a false conclusion: it cannot be a matter - in peace ethics and elsewhere - of reducing the question of ethics in institutions - i.e., institutional ethics - to virtue ethics understood purely in terms of individual ethics; on the contrary, ethical principles and norms must be implemented at the level of institutional ethics and become an integrated component of all institutions. However, it is not enough to issue a blanket ethical clean bill of health to all entrepreneurially active organizations, because every company already pursues ethical goals by virtue of its orientation. After all, no one can deny that institutions or their representatives repeatedly act unethically, and at the most diverse levels: This may be the case with regard to the product distributed, in product quality, in dealing with customers, in the treatment of employees, in marketing, in non-compliance with laws, by forming monopolies, by violating environmental standards or by corruption.

Perhaps the answer - as Merkl (2015:168) suggests - lies in combining utilitarian ethics, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics: Here, utilitarianism is oriented toward the principle

of utility, deontological ethics calls for rules and norms of behavior, and virtue ethics focuses on issues of personal character and related courses of action (cf. Lawler and Salzmann 2013:443).

However, the following should be kept in mind: "It is not the ought that constitutes the good, but the good that constitutes the moral ought" (Schockenhoff 2014:67). This is also true with respect to the virtues: It is not the virtues that constitute the good, but the (recognized) good that is the precondition of virtue-ethical behavior. This has methodological consequences: That which can be called good is not simply the consequence of virtuous behavior. Rather, a virtue is the actionable implementation of the recognized and internalized good. Accordingly, in the sense of Thomas Aquinas, "bonum faciendum, malum vitandum" is to do the good and avoid the bad (cf. Schockenhoff 2014:67).

The good and its experience are thus, so to speak, at the cradle of all action: "Whoever does not know the encounter with the demanding power of the good is not missing a casual experience in life, but an essential dimension of being human. ... Whoever does not understand the idea of the good has not understood what it means to be a human being and to live as a human being. The question of the good - as the question of what gives meaning to life as a whole - is so deeply inscribed in human existence that no one who wants to live a conscious life can avoid it in the long run" (Schockenhoff 2014:68).

3. Control Questions

1. What double question did Bobbio ask?
2. According to Aregay, on what two grounds - or points of view - can a constitution be invoked?
3. According to which two criteria can a political world order be constructed?
4. Why is the fight against violence and terror never just a military question?
5. What does Schuppert mean by intertwined statehood?
6. Why, according to Schuppert, increasing international interdependence leads to an increased need for rules and norms?

Unit D 43: The missing world state

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7. To which aspects of international development can the growth of populist movements be attributed?
8. According to Schuppert, what mechanism of action can explain the growing pressure on international organizations to legitimize themselves?
9. According to Kant, what two forms can the "supreme legislative, governing and judging power" take at the world level?
10. According to Höffe, why is the establishment of a world state morally imperative?
11. What three tasks would such a world state have according to Höffe?
12. To what extent is a world state not a substitute but a supplement to nation states according to Höffe?
13. According to Höffe, how would a world state or a world legislature have to be organized?
14. Which six main objections against a world republic does Höffe list, and what are the counter-arguments against these objections?
15. Which two aspects of subsidiarity of a world state does Höffe mention?
16. What problem exists with regard to international markets?
17. Which three debates about "regional mega-states" does Cohen see?
18. What vision instead of the world republic idea did Habermas develop for an international political order?
19. How does Mouffe argue against the world state idea?
20. What problem did Hidalgo point out?
21. In what way could a world state also be overburdened?
22. Explain the world citizen idea!
23. Name the four principles of participation in civic life ("citizenship").
24. What are the three ethical demands in politics today and especially for a democratic world state?
25. Outline the approach of virtue ethics.
26. What characterizes a person of "integrity"?

4. Links

Auf dem Weg zum Weltstaat?

<https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2008/juli-august/auf-dem-weg-zum-weltstaat>

Der Weltstaat: One World – thousand dreams

Von Luc Saner

<http://www.aubonsens.ch/schriften/staatsleitung/weltstaat.pdf>

Weltbürgertum

<http://www.weltdemokratie.de/033d3a9c4709e1d01/index.html>

Wertbürger – das Zeitalter der Kosmopolitisierung

<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/weltbuerger-das-zeitalter-der-kosmopolitisierung-12559988.html>

Riskante Weltstaat-Utopie

Von Robert Nef

<http://www.libinst.ch/?i=riskante-weltstaat-utopie>

CIA bekennt sich zum Militärputsch 1953 im Iran

<http://www.welt.de/geschichte/article119180782/CIA-bekannt-sich-zu-Militaerputsch-1953-im-Iran.html>

Vor 60 Jahren: Putsch gegen Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala 1954

<http://www.nzz.ch/international/putsch-gegen-jacobo-arbenz-in-guatemala-1.18330142>

Entstehen Kriege aus Zufall – oder nicht?

http://www.initiative.cc/Artikel/2003_06_18%20Kriege%20als%20Zufall.htm

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