

Unit I 30: Migration

1. Summary

The term "migration" comes from the Latin "migrare", meaning to move. By migration we mean a more or less permanent relocation of the place of residence and living. In 2005, there were an estimated 200 million migrants worldwide; today, there are probably more than 300 million. The reasons for migration are manifold and are weighted differently by different migration theories. Migration benefits not only the migrating individuals themselves, but also the countries of immigration and emigration. But migration also leads to negative effects, again for both the country of immigration and the region of origin. Migration groups tend to be heterogeneous and disparate.

2. Migration

Cross-border migration was defined by economist Giorgio Dhima (1991:21) as follows: **"An international migrant is one who resides permanently or temporarily in a country other than his or her home country for purposes of gainful employment and/or settlement."** However, because many - perhaps even the majority - of migratory movements do not cross national borders, this definition is not entirely satisfactory. Moreover, Dhima (1991:23) explicitly excludes illegal migrants in this definition. I therefore propose a **broader definition of migration:**

Migrations are all migratory movements of individuals and groups that are associated with a geographical relocation of personal living space and a change of cultural environment.

"Migration" is thus understood as an umbrella term for all migratory movements, regardless of whether the migrants live in another country as labor migrants, asylum seekers or refugees, as temporary residents, e.g. as seasonal or annual residents, as settled residents or, at most, without a valid residence permit (so-called sans-papiers).

Migrants live and work for several months, but mostly for years or decades in another country or region of their home country.

2.1 Migration: Facts and Figures

Mervyn Frost (2009:114) points out that the migration issue is usually presented under the following ethical dilemma. Is it primarily about the personal rights of (migrating) individuals or are the rights of states, or the native populations of the countries of immigration, at the center? But the issue is much more complex.

But first: How many migrants are there actually?

In 2010, there were approximately one billion international migrants and internal migrants, i.e. migrants within their own countries, on our planet (Sugiyarto 2015:277/279). According to estimates by the International Organization for Migration IOM, 214 million international migrants faced about 740 million internal migrants.

According to Dieter Oberndörfer (2009:75), the numbers of world population and international migrants (incl. "illegal" migrants, asylum seekers and refugees) developed as follows - for comparison, I give the corresponding figures of the world population:

| Year | World population | Migrants |
|------|------------------|-------------|
| 1970 | 3,698 billion | 82 million |
| 2000 | 6,251 billion | 175 million |
| 2005 | 6,517 billion | 200 million |
| 2015 | 7,350 billion | 290 million |
| 2017 | 7,550 billion | 305 million |
| 2019 | 7,710 billion | 311 million |
| 2020 | 7,790 billion | 310 million |

Sources: <http://www.blick.it/angebote/modellmathe/ma0154.htm>;
<http://www.geolinde.musin.de/aktuell/menschen03/dsw05.htm>,
<http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1716/umfrage/entwicklung-der-weltbevoelkerung/>; Oberndörfer 2009:75 and own calculations.

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Thus, migration increased by 113% from 1970 to 2000, while the world population grew by 69% in the same period. From 1970 to 2005, the increase in migration was as high as 143%, while the world population grew by 76% in the same period. However, it should not be forgotten that in 2010, for example, only one in four migrants moved to the industrialized countries of the West, while the rest migrated to emerging economies (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.11.2011). In 1999, the Commission on Human Security estimated that of the approximately 175 million international migrants-at that time about 3% of the world's population-about 60% lived in developing countries (Estrada-Tanck 2015:272).

In 2011, there were about 215 million migrants worldwide (cf. McLeman 2014:1); in 2013, global migration was already estimated at 232 million people, which meant an increase of 30% since 2000 and compared to (cf. Rist in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 4, 2013).

Of the 200 million migrants in 2005, 20 million came from the African region (Ketelers 2009:88).

According to Oberndörfer (2009:75), in 2009 about 60% of migrants lived in highly developed countries-particularly the U.S., Europe, and Australia-and about 40% lived in developing countries. In 2013, the U.S. was still the most important country of immigration, with 45.8 million immigrants worldwide - about 20% of the world's migrants (cf. Rist in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Oct. 4, 2013). South-South migration has also increased since 2000. Mexico, for example, experienced a 50% increase in immigration from the South after 2000 (cf. Rist in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4.10.2013).

Since 1970, the share of international migrants in the populations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has successively and significantly decreased (Oberndörfer 2009:75).

In contrast, the proportion of skilled individuals within migration increased worldwide. Small and poor countries were particularly affected by this "brain drain."

In addition to international migrants, it is estimated that in 2005 there were approximately 26 million people who had to leave their own area of residence due to conflicts or

environmental disasters and now live as internally displaced persons in their own countries (Ketelers 2009:89). Seven years later, i.e. at the end of 2012, the so-called "displaced people", i.e. internally displaced people fleeing war and violence in their own country, were estimated at 28.8 million (cf. Kälin 2014:164) and internally displaced people due to environmental disasters at a further 42.3 million (2011) and 32.4 million (2012) (cf. Kälin 2014:164). Of these internal migrants, an estimated 50% were living in Africa at the beginning of the 21st century. However, estimates of environmental change as a cause of migration vary widely. For example, Sari Hanafi (2014:594) estimated a total of 33.8 million people affected by natural disasters for countries in the Middle East and North Africa from 1991 to 2010-with 23,500 people killed at the same time.

In 2011, experts expected between 250 million and one billion migrants and refugees over the next 40 years as a result of climate change (see International Organization for Migration 2012:63). Central to understanding environmental migration is the concept of vulnerability. Vulnerability can be understood as a function between the extent to which a population is exposed to environmental factors and its ability to adapt. Accordingly, (environmental) migration can be a survival strategy or an adaptation strategy (see International Organization for Migration 2012:63).

However, all migration figures should be taken with caution. For example, the question arises whether the estimated 200 million Chinese migrant workers who work in Chinese metropolises for shorter or longer periods of time or the 300-400 million Chinese who are expected to move from the countryside to the cities in the next 20-30 years (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25.2.2010) should also be counted as internal migrants. In India, the number of residents leaving their villages to seek work was estimated at around 400 million people in 2011 - out of a population of 1.21 billion (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22.5.2014:7). It is not entirely clear to what extent the greater mobility within individual countries does not also represent a kind of partial migration phenomenon - for example, if one thinks of the millions of commuters in the Western European countries.

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In an international comparison, the shares of migrants in the resident population have been and still are very different depending on the country. The following table shows the figures for 2012 (estimates):

| Country | Share of immigrants in the total population in %. | Net immigration on average over the last 5 years (2008-2012) |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Qatar | 76.3% | 171'000 |
| United Arab Emirates | 70.6% | 615'000 |
| Saudi Arabia | 24,7% | 211'000 |
| Switzerland | 22.8% | 76'000 |
| Australia | 21.0% | 225'000 |
| Canada | 18.1% | 220'000 |
| USA | 12.1% | 991'000 |
| Russia | 8.1% | 227'000 |
| Great Britain | 8.1% | 204'000 |
| Spain | 4.4% | 450'000 |
| Italy | 3.7% | 400'000 |

Source: Müller In Schweizerische Handelszeitung vom 11.4.2013.

Within Europe, it is striking that there are clear immigration countries on the one hand and equally clear emigration countries on the other.

In Switzerland, far more people immigrated from EU countries than from non-EU countries in 2012, while in the major immigration countries of the EU - above all Germany and France, but also Italy and Spain - it was exactly the opposite. One is therefore not wrong to see countries like Switzerland as a kind of intake sponge for highly and medium-skilled people throughout Europe - albeit at a numerically low level (61,000 versus 506 million inhabitants of the EU, see Statista 2014). In Switzerland, seco economists estimate net immigration in 2013 - i.e., immigration after deducting those who left Switzerland - at 84,000 persons, of whom 61,000 came from EU countries under the free movement of persons with the EU, while 23,000 immigrated from third countries (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 11.1.2014a:27).

Countries such as Germany or France exercise a similar suction function on a global level.

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Immigrants are among the most entrepreneurially active population groups. For example, Indian and Pakistani immigrants in the United Kingdom and Turkish immigrants in Germany are known to be the most entrepreneurially active, as evidenced by company start-ups. In 2013, 4 out of 10 new companies in Switzerland were founded by foreigners, while their share of the total population was only just over 23%, according to the FSO. These new firms created 30,000 new jobs in 2013 alone (see Wittwer/Speiser in Schweizerische Handelszeitung, Jan. 16, 2014). Between 2000 and 2014, the share of foreign company formations rose from 22% to 40% of all newly founded firms, according to the business information service Bisnode D&B (Wittwer/Speiser in Schweizerische Handelszeitung of Jan. 16, 2014). Germans were the most active: In 2009 alone, Germans founded companies in Switzerland with 60,000 jobs, and in 2013 there were still 2200 start-ups with 5700 jobs. The Italians founded 2300 companies with 5500 jobs in 2013, followed by the French with 1014 companies with a good 3500 jobs (Wittwer/Speiser in Schweizerische Handelszeitung of 16.1.2014).

In principle, migration can be seen as a form of "risk investment" (cf. Rispens-Noel/Opiniano 2015:182) - and not only among migrants who are entrepreneurial in the country of immigration. According to Stark and Blum's (1985) theory, a family or, more precisely, a household that sends a member to emigrate decides to increase its income and share the associated risk. In doing so, the families in question are usually acutely aware of the risk and know the peculiarities and pitfalls of the relevant labor market. However - according to Wickramasekara 2015:171 - the social costs of migration for migrants and their families are usually underestimated, such as the consequences of family separation or the situation of the children. For this reason, the distinction between "voluntary" and "involuntary" migration is misleading: How much do living conditions in a place have to deteriorate for "voluntary" migration to become "involuntary" migration (see also Hanlon/Vicino 2014:7)? The closest thing to an economic term can help here: The so-called opportunity costs. These are the costs that arise when a decision - e.g. the decision to leave the country or the place of origin - results in the loss of potential returns from other options. Every decision has opportunity costs associated with it because it eliminates other alternatives. Once I move away, staying home is no longer an option.

Conversely, economic studies have shown that welfare states and their social institutions are particularly attractive to poorly qualified migrants and help influence their choice of immigration country (cf. Razin/Sadka 2014:23/24). Conversely, there is a widespread view that, on the one hand, highly skilled immigrants are net contributors to welfare state institutions and, on the other hand, the lowest wages tend to be raised by the higher wages of highly skilled immigrants (cf. Razin/Sadka 2014:45).

2.2 Refugees

In general, a strict distinction is made between economic causes of migration on the one hand and causes of flight such as political repression, persecution, war, etc. on the other. Judith Gruber (2015:83) has pointed out that many European and non-European countries distinguish between "economic refugees" (= "migrants") and "real" asylum seekers and refugees. Gruber (2015:83) criticizes, not entirely without reason, that this distinction is a more or less artificial demarcation to hide the complex causes of migration and flight. Often economic and other causes of flight merge. According to Gruber (2015:83), this distinction renders invisible our own contribution to the causes of flight and migration: this distinction helps us to ignore the manifold and complex causes of migration, such as economic, historical, colonial, postcolonial, and neocolonial dependencies. Therefore, it is undoubtedly true that the distinction between "genuine" and "spurious" causes of flight is rather a nation-state and political-strategic tool to keep immigration and immigration low and to control it.

According to the wording of the 1951 Refugee Convention, anyone who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (cited in Brown 2015:46, translation into German by CJ) is entitled to recognition as a refugee.

In addition, other causes of migration and flight have recently been added: Environmental problems and climate change, family reunification, religious oppression or belonging to discriminated groups (e.g. homosexuality). Furthermore, it is still controversial whether the

fact that someone belongs to a persecuted ethnic group, without being able to prove individual persecution, is sufficient to be granted asylum.

Despite these issues, we maintain the classic distinction between "migration" caused by more economic reasons and "flight" caused by personal persecution - mainly because most nation-state laws - such as in Switzerland between the Aliens Act and the Asylum Act - also make this distinction.

In 2013 and 2014, global refugee movements increased massively, with the causes of flight mostly being war, violence and environmental degradation.

Well known is the war situation in Syria, Iraq, but also in many countries of northern Africa as a cause of flight. What is less known, however, is that climatic unrest preceded the various armed conflicts: in 2009, for example, of the approximately 22 million Syrians, a full 1.5 million Syrians were affected by advancing desertification, which led to a massive exodus of farmers, cattle breeders and their families from the countryside. Overgrazing, exploitation of natural resources, and a nearly 50% decline in groundwater reserves led to social unrest, opposition movements, and ultimately civil war in Syria (see Sinai in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 2015:1). Boko Haram areas in western Africa had also experienced massive climatic changes, drought formation, and other ecological problems before they became strong, forcing entire villages to be abandoned (cf. Sinai in *Le Monde Diplomatique* September 2015:18).

Geographically, the main flows of refugees in 2014 moved to three destination regions: to Europe, to North America, and - in much smaller numbers - to Australia.

The main areas of origin of refugees in Europe and other regions in 2013 and 2014 were Afghanistan, Syria and Somalia (cf. Schmid/Gross in *Schweizerische Handelszeitung* of 10.9.2015:10).

In 2013, many refugees also arrived from Central and East Africa, the Middle East and South Asia (Burma; see Kapp in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 21.6.2014:5).

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In recent years, two migration and flight routes to Europe have become particularly important: On the one hand, the route via the Mediterranean Sea and, on the other hand, the route via Southeastern Europe. The route from Africa via the Mediterranean Sea gained importance especially after 2010 (see source: Haefliger in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 9.10.2013).

Also within Africa, actual flight and migration transit routes formed in recent years, namely from West Africa via Libya and from the Horn of Africa also towards Libya and Egypt (cf. Putsch in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 9.2.2017:7).


In the summer of 2015, the refugee situation in and around Europe intensified massively. Tens of thousands of refugees chose the Eastern European route to Germany.

It seems that especially better-off people can afford to flee to Europe. At the beginning of 2016, of around 900 refugees surveyed in Austria - some of whom had already arrived in the country before 2015 - more than 50% from Iraq, Syria and Iran had vocational training or a degree; only among Afghans was the figure significantly lower:

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Sources: Benz in Neue Zürcher Zeitung vom 13.1.2016:1 sowie eigene Recherchen.

But other refugee hot spots outside Europe should not be forgotten: For example, migration and refugee movements from East Africa - especially from the Somali coast - to South Africa have also increased in the course of recent years (cf. Haefliger in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28.3.2014:9).

In another region of the world, South Asia, a separate network of migration and refugee routes has developed in recent years (cf. Rist in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 21.5.2015:3).

Of the approximately 200 million international migrants in 2005, about 9 million were refugees, i.e. people who had to leave their country due to danger "to life and limb". This number has risen massively since then. According to Jean-Pierre Kapp (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21.6.2014:5), 51.2 million people were registered as refugees with the UNHCR alone at the end of 2013. In 2015, it was estimated that the number of refugees worldwide was already close to 60 million.

A particular problem for asylum seekers and refugees is that the causes of flight and the character of refugees have changed, especially in comparison to the understanding of

refugees in the 1951 Refugee Convention. As Susan E. Zimmermann (2014:39) writes with regard to the United Kingdom, reasons for flight such as environmental problems, poverty, search for economic survival, etc. are often understood as "abuse" of the right to asylum. This is true for many European countries, including Switzerland. At the same time, the UNHCR (cf. Zimmermann 2014:39) has also pointed out that many asylum seekers leave their homeland for a combination of reasons: War, political persecution, environmental situation, job loss, hunger or simply hope for a better life.

In addition, the number of unaccompanied minor asylum seekers has increased significantly in recent times. According to estimates, up to 80% of these underage asylum seekers are moderately to severely traumatized (Krummenacher/Gerny/Aschwanden in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 20.11.2015:15). This poses additional problems for the receiving countries. For example, while in the canton of Baselland minors were housed together with adult asylum seekers, the same canton decided to open a separate center for underage asylum seekers. The canton of Lucerne opened a center for underage asylum seekers in Kriens in November 2015, and the canton of St. Gallen also decided to open such a center in Vilters at the beginning of 2016. Underage asylum-seeking girls were also accommodated in the Pestalozzi village of Trogen. In St. Gallen, asylum seekers under the age of 14 are placed in foster families (see Krummenacher/Gerny/Aschwanden in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 20.11.2015:15).

Recent studies have shown that the very poor population groups migrate less due to lack of financial means (travel costs!), while on the other hand the tendency to migrate increases among people with middle income. In 2015, the migration and flight costs from West Africa amounted to about 2000 dollars until arrival in Lampedusa, while an Eritrean had to reckon with about 3000 dollars (cf. Haefliger in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 13.11.2015:6). Experts assume that for people with a medium income in developing countries, the incentive to emigrate is greatest, while from an income of about 7000 dollars a year, the tendency to migrate decreases again (cf. Haefliger in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of 13.11.2015:6). The research of Michael Clemens has also shown that in the range of an annual per capita income of 8000 to 10'000 dollars migration increases, at least for a certain time. This means that in an emerging state, economic growth and thus economic development promotes

emigration in the short to medium term and only reduces it in the long term (see Eisenring in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 29.6.2018:25).

According to the UNHCR, 59.5 million people were displaced at the end of 2014. In 2013, there had been 51.2 million, ten years earlier 37.5 million people. This means that the increase in refugees from 2013 to 2014 was the highest ever documented by the UNHCR within one year (see UNHCR, 18.6.2015). Of the refugees, about two-thirds were and are being taken in by developing countries; before the great wave of refugees to Europe in 2015, only about one-third were taken in by wealthy countries. Thus, in 2013 (see Wagner in Neue Luzerner Zeitung, 5.10.2013), many of the refugees themselves were again living in poor and poorest countries. Refugee monitoring clearly shows that at the end of 2012 and beyond, most refugees continued to live in the Central Asia/Middle East/East Africa region (cf. Wagner in Neue Luzerner Zeitung of 5.10.2013).

In the past decade, both the number of refugees and the number of "displaced people" increased; in 2014, about 90% of refugees lived in countries considered economically less developed. A quarter of refugees even lived in states considered among the least developed (UNHCR 6/18/2015). Nevertheless, in 2014, the number of refugees increased by 51% in Europe, 19% in the Middle East, 17% in Sub-Saharan Africa - excluding Nigeria, 31% in Asia, and 12% in the Americas (UNHCR 6/18/2015).

But where did these refugees come from? Apart from refugees living in Europe, most came from countries or regions immediately adjacent to their own.

Characteristic of many war refugees is the fact that their numbers can grow extraordinarily quickly. Probably the largest refugee catastrophe in recent times - at least since the civil war in Rwanda of around 20 years - was experienced by Syria in 2013 and 2014: over 2.5 million people fled to neighboring countries, half of them children. And this figure covers only the refugees officially registered by the UNHCR - in reality, it is likely to be far more. Within Syria in 2014, another 6.5 million people were on the flight (see Bolliger in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 4.9.2013 as well as Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 23.4.2014).

Not only in refugee areas, but also on migration routes leading to countries that are critical of immigration and try to counter it with more or less repressive means, the large numbers of deaths are striking. For example, a broad research by European journalists revealed that between 2000 and 2014, more than 23,000 people died or were reported missing on their way to Europe (see Gruhnwald/Kohli in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 2.4.2014:7). In their investigation, the journalists relied, among other things, on the database of the United for Intercultural Action network and the "Fortress Europe" project. Because the study was based only on documented witness accounts, it can be assumed that the true number of deaths is much higher (cf. Gruhnwald/Kohli in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 2.4.2014:7). In 2015, there were again several refugee disasters in the Mediterranean. For example, in mid-April 2015, the capsizing of a refugee boat in the Mediterranean Sea probably killed around 800 people from Africa and the Middle East in a single day (cf. Nuspliger in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of 23.4.2015b:3).

But what is the situation in the receiving countries?

The example of Sweden shows how massively the situation has worsened in some European countries: in Sweden, which has traditionally been one of the European countries with the most open policy towards refugees, took in around 80,000 refugees in 2014, and in 2015 the number was already 200,000 (cf. Langer in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of 8.12.2015:14).

A particular problem is the integration of asylum seekers and refugees into the labor market. A seco study examined this issue for Switzerland in 2014. The study found that in 2014, the employment rate of refugees was 20% two years after arrival and 40% after seven years. However, the number of refugees absorbed by the labor market is still low. In 2014, for example, around 500,000 people entered the labor market in Switzerland - and a noticeable effect on the labor market would only come from 10,000 to 20,000 refugees taking up work. However, the study assumes that only just 3000 asylum seekers are likely to find a job in the next two years (cf. Rütli in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 10.3.2016:1).

The employment rate of provisionally admitted persons and recognized refugees in Switzerland shows a similar picture - and, above all, large regional differences. For example,

at the end of July 2016, just 28.7% of provisionally admitted refugees between the ages of 18 and 65 were employed in Switzerland - three years earlier, the figure had been 10% higher (cf. Wirth in *Neue Luzerner Zeitung*, August 12, 2016:5). Among recognized refugees, just 22.5% were employed in 2016. As the chart below shows, the employment rate varied between 60.4% (Obwalden) and 8.9% (Geneva; cf. Wirth in *Neue Luzerner Zeitung* of 12.8.2016:5).

There are various explanations for these large differences in labor market integration by canton: Cantonal differences in unemployment rates (the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the employment rate of refugees), different weighting of integration into the labor market by individual cantons (cantons in western Switzerland tend to place less emphasis on it), harsh - i.e. restrictive - social welfare practices in individual cantons - and pressure on refugees to seek employment (e.g. e.g. Graubünden), but also strong networking of the integration offices in the small cantons with the economy and with trade and industry, as well as many low-threshold jobs in the catering and construction industries (e.g. Graubünden; cf. Wirth in *Neue Luzerner Zeitung*, 12.8.2016:5).

An international comparison shows that the integration of asylum seekers and refugees into the labor market varies greatly. According to OECD data, the number of asylum seekers in Europe increased from 1.6 million to 4 million people from 2014 to 2017. While refugees had little impact on the working-age population in some European countries, the working-age population increased by more than 0.5% in Luxembourg and Greece due to refugees, and by more than 1% in Sweden, Austria and Germany. This effect was much smaller in France, Norway, Italy and Switzerland, at around 0.4%. However, in a number of countries, due to refugees, the number of young and poorly educated men has grown much more compared to 2013, according to estimates in Switzerland by 10%, in Austria by 21% and in Germany by 18% (Tzermias in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of 21.6.2018:27).

Reasons for the poor integration of asylum seekers and refugees into the labor market include the ban on asylum seekers working in the first few months, but also language barriers and - in the longer term - a lack of professional qualifications. At the same time, the gap between the requirements for job seekers in the labor market and the professional

qualifications of asylum seekers and refugees is increasing. For example, unemployment among people without post-compulsory education increased from 5.3% to more than 7% since the late 1990s, while it remained at around 2.6% among people with a tertiary education (see Rütli in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 10.3.2016:1). An opening of the labor markets combined with incentives for additional professional qualifications (further education) could improve the employment situation of asylum seekers and refugees, but may also lead to greater competition among job seekers.

In addition to all these difficulties and challenges, there are also more positive sides to migration. For example, in 2004, formal remittances from migrants to their home countries were estimated at about \$150 billion (Oberndörfer 2009:76). Informal remittances were estimated to be as high as 300 billion U.S. dollars. In 2010, the remittances sent by migrants in emerging countries to their countries of origin - also emerging countries - amounted to 26 billion U.S. dollars. In 2013, remittances worldwide were even estimated at 414 billion US dollars (cf. Kraler/Noack 2014:31). This means that formal remittances already exceeded official development assistance by a factor of three (Oberndörfer 2009:76). For 2015, extrapolated estimates of global remittances by migrants to their home countries were 515 billion US dollars (cf. Hanlon/Vicino 2014:97). In 2009, about \$316 billion went to developing countries (Sugiyarto 2015:279).

The largest recipient countries were Bangladesh, Nepal and Sudan, while the largest sender countries among the emerging economies were India, Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and South Africa (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 18.11.2011). However, studies have shown that remittances hardly ever trigger development impulses; they are mostly used for family maintenance or, at most, for house construction, but hardly ever for starting a small business (cf. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6.5.2015:21; cf. also ► Unit V 21: "International Development Goals," chapter 2.5).

Jochen Oltmer (2010:63) pointed out that three interrelated levels are involved in the migration decision: First, at the micro level, individual and family circumstances and survival strategies; second, at the meso level, regional cultural, social and economic structures; and

third, at the macro level, the political and legal framework within a territory and the overarching rules and norms.

2.3 Why do people migrate?

Classical economic migration research has distinguished between so-called **pull** and so-called **push factors**: push factors are forces "that induce individuals to migrate toward the center. [They] can be seen in the impoverishment mechanisms that become particularly effective in rural areas of the Third World, in the lack of jobs, in the lack of educational opportunities, in the absence of health care, and more. Pull forces, in turn, are those factors in the centers that attract migrants. These include jobs, educational opportunities, consumer offerings, and all the stimuli that a center produces. For migration to occur, both elements-both - **pull and push forces** - must be present" (Wicker 1993:19). This model assumes that human individuals, in the form of a rational-search and weighing process, contrast the advantages and disadvantages of migrating or remaining in one's place of residence and then decide for or against migration. **Decisive for migration** decisions are **pressure factors**; **pull factors** mainly **influence** the choice of the immigration country and **the migration destination**. Migrations are interactions or exchange processes, which are associated with costs for all participants. Factors that increase these costs for the migrants (e.g. homeland attachment, religion, etc.) have a migration-inhibiting effect.

Teitelbaum (2008:55) rightly points out that there is a whole range of migration theories, with hardly any of them being broad enough, coherent and convincing. Here are the main theoretical approaches (adapted from Teitelbaum 2008:55/56):

- **Neoclassical macroeconomic migration theory**: as a result of large differences between the supply and demand of labor, migration movements occur. According to this idea, migration will stop as soon as these differences between supply and demand of labor disappear.
- **Neoclassical microeconomic approach**: According to this, individuals rationally and individually decide to migrate by maximizing their utility, fully aware of the costs and benefits of such a decision. Again, the supply and demand for labor or jobs are the primary considerations.

- **Social Group and Family Theories:** In this conception, migration decisions are more likely to be made by social groups or families, and again only if migration benefits the group. Migration is seen not only in terms of higher group income, but also as a way to distribute and reduce insecurity and local risks, and to improve access to credit.
- **Dual labor market:** In this view, pull factors predominate over push factors. That is, the decisive factor is the attractiveness of the immigration and receiving countries. From the employers' point of view, the fact that low-wage workers can be recruited is interesting. As a result, entire contingents of cheap labor can be hired at will and fired as needed.
- **World-System Theories:** Again, bandwagon factors predominate, but markets are understood as global rather than national: Multinational firms and neocolonialism permeate peripheral, non-capitalist countries with capitalist practices, strategies, and relationships. As a result, they also stimulate international migration.
- **Social network theories:** this approach emphasizes the permanence of migration, even when the original incentives have disappeared or weakened. Such social networks have a transnational character, reduce the risk associated with migration, and become permanent, even reinforcing processes. Cf. ► Unit I 31: "Transnationality an migration".
- **Institutional theories:** Here, the focus is on social institutions and on enterprises that emerge from the needs of migrants. These institutions can be for-profit or not-for-profit. They can be completely legal, operate in the "gray area" or even in illegality. They include "migration lawyers," consultants, labor brokers, or simply people smugglers or "traffickers."

Migration depends on the international "development gap" and on the global enforcement of certain - mostly western - values and norms. The potential for migration is essentially dependent on two determining factors, namely "the development gap between national units as a structural, and value integration, which legitimizes the claim to social mobility, as a cultural moment" (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1989:30).

Especially in the more recent migration discourse, a close connection between migration and development has been established.

Causes of emigration and flight include hunger, destruction of livelihoods (soil erosion, salinization, lack of drinking water, droughts, floods), unemployment, armed conflicts, torture, and ethno-cultural conflicts.

Migration movements are, among other things, an **expression of scarcity of resources or an effect of their one-sided consumption by people living in Western Europe and North America**. Not least, this **unequal global consumption of natural resources** and the associated structural social, economic and political marginalization of large parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America increasingly destroyed traditional ecological balances (e.g. deforestation, erosion or salinization of fertile soil, scarcity or pollution of fresh water). Even if for some time now various sources (for example the report of the Interdepartmental Strategy Group FDJP/EDA/EVD 1989:31) have cited **demographic reasons** as causes of migration and flight ahead of economic, ecological and political ones, it should be pointed out that population growth is not least dependent on the economic, political, socio-cultural and ecological development of a region - at least more so than vice versa. The population explosion is **rather a consequence** of social injustice and lack of economic development as a **cause** of poverty, hardship and migration.

We can conclude from this: **migration is a life strategy for people in areas of need, disaster and war, but also a strategy for improving personal life situations.**

2.4 Who benefits from migration?

Migrants individually bear a significant part of the costs of migration, but also benefit from it. However, some of the costs are also borne by those who do not migrate themselves. Conversely, the native, i.e., non-migrant, population of the destination country also benefits from the returns to migration (see Sjaastad 2014:12).

Accordingly, migration has both positive and negative effects for receiving countries and, to some extent, for emigrating countries. Positive for the immigration countries are a rejuvenation of the population, contributions to social security and taxes, and a

strengthening of the innovative power of the economy. For example, Switzerland weathered the euro crisis better than most other European countries thanks in part to uninterrupted immigration of medium- and highly-skilled individuals from the EU under the bilateral agreements (see Schmidt/Stalder in *Die Volkswirtschaft* 1/2-2013:11). It is estimated that the strong population growth in Switzerland between 2010 and 2013 caused an additional 0.6% increase in Switzerland's gross domestic product (cf. Schmidt/Stalder in *Die Volkswirtschaft* 1/2-2013:13).

Negative for immigration countries is the stronger socio-cultural polarization, the emergence of new or the deepening of existing conflicts, and in some cases an increase in racism.

Countries of emigration benefit from the financial remittances, as remittances from migrants to the country of origin. Furthermore, there are also positive learning effects in the country of origin. Gülcan Akkaya (2010) pointed to the double transfer of material resources and education from the country of immigration to the migrants' home countries: "for the ... relatives [of migrants from Macedonia, note CJ], the first priority in relation to migration is the financial benefits, which are used in Tetovo for consumer goods, house construction, health care, and education. But there is also a transfer of information, know-how and education - returnees have founded many small businesses in recent years. Especially ... Knowledge gained from experience in craft trades is met with great interest in Tetovo."

Edma Ajanovic (2014:110) has pointed out that remittances are not only money - i.e. economic capital - that is transferred to the emigration countries, but they also create cultural and symbolic capital, for example in the form of status, social recognition and respect.

A negative factor for the emigration countries is the "brain drain" - often it is the most innovative and best educated people who emigrate. In Albania, for example, 35.4% of those employed in research and teaching had already migrated abroad between 1990 and 1998. In a 1999 survey of university graduates in Albania, 63% said they wanted to emigrate (Sterbling 2008:143). Moreover, the influence of pull factors - for example, via the image of

Western lifestyles conveyed by the media - can increase social tensions in the emigration country.

But brain drain can also be a problem for rich countries. In 2014, for example, it became known that Austria has been suffering from a massive brain drain loss of highly qualified people for years: the number of highly qualified people emigrating exceeded the number of highly qualified immigrants by up to 10,000 people per year (cf. Kattinger in neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 1, 2014). Destination countries of emigrating highly skilled Austrians were primarily Germany, Switzerland, North America and Great Britain (cf. Kattinger in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 1.4.2014).

While migrants benefit from labor shortages in times of upswing, they are also the first to be laid off in times of crisis. In a study in July 2010, the OECD concluded that immigration and naturalization of foreigners are necessary to maintain long-term growth potential in highly developed countries (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13.7.2010). This was impressively demonstrated during the economic crisis of 2007-2009: In the five years before the economic crisis, for example, the number of immigrants per year in the OECD area rose by about 11%. By contrast, the number of immigrants fell by 6% to 4.4 million in the OECD countries in 2008. The downward trend continued in 2009. This shows that immigrants have been disproportionately affected by the economic crisis, serving as an economic buffer, so to speak.

The crisis has also changed the composition of international migration. In 2007, for example - shortly before the outbreak of the financial crisis - Germans accounted for 63% of net immigration from the EU to Switzerland. In that year, only 5% of new immigrants came from Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece and 8% from Eastern Europe (see Lukac/Weber in Die Volkswirtschaft 6-2013:5). In 2012, Germans accounted for just 15% of net immigration, while 51% came from the four southern European countries and 20% from the eastern European countries (cf. Lukac/Weber in Die Volkswirtschaft 6-2013:5). This is probably due not least to the higher qualifications of German immigrants, who were in high demand during the boom. Conversely, unemployment rates in 2011 were 25% in Spain, 16% in Portugal and 11% in Italy, while Germany had just 5.5% unemployed in 2011 (Switzerland

2011: 4.2%). In other words: Poverty migration from Southern European and Eastern European countries increased significantly after 2010.

Migration also creates social, cultural and gender role conflicts, both among migrants and among members of the host society. However, not only the emigration countries and the immigration regions, but also the migrants themselves often - though not always - benefit from migration. Based on the inequality approach, Ulrich Beck (2008:33) has listed three groups of profiteers of border crossings:

- "1. Those who have the appropriate **economic capital** or **cultural capital** that enables him or her to choose the optimal context for their own exploitation find themselves in a better position than those who (for whatever reason ...) are bound to the nation-state framework and space in the unfolding of their life chances....
2. In addition, there are **the non-intended instrumentalization possibilities of border regions**. All attempts to make the policy of demarcation legally and militarily watertight unintentionally (and unseen) tear open holes which resourceful and experienced people know how to use for the purpose of crafting cross-border forms of existence. ...
3. The at best tolerated, often criminalized 'loop hole artists' are **highly functional**, even if they appear illegitimate or illegal in the national view..."

This also means that those who benefit from migration processes are not always identical with the political actors, and may even be in conflict with them.

The strict isolation of immigration countries, such as the European Union or Switzerland, against migrants is particularly problematic. Those willing to migrate and asylum seekers are often ripped off by smugglers even before the transfer begins and the only ones who - and as the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (of 6.5.2015:21) pointedly stated - profit from this compartmentalization are the smugglers: "The smugglers disappear with the money, the bounced person is powerless. If the journey actually takes place, it resembles a desert odyssey with hunger, thirst, brutality, rape, imprisonment, repatriation, arbitrariness, a new attempt, kidnapping, blackmail" (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6.5.2015:21). And not infrequently the journey ends in death, for example in the desert or in the Mediterranean.

There are two interpretative directions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a "legalistic" and a "protection-oriented" one (cf. Houston 2015:11). While the first view primarily emphasizes the relationship between "protection" and "state," the second understanding also focuses primarily on the well-founded fear of persecution. Whereas the Refugee Convention focused primarily on interstate flight and persecution, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are concerned with the lot of persons without nationality ("stateless persons"). Another problem is that of internally displaced persons, who have left their original place of residence but have not crossed national borders.

Here, immigration countries face an ethical dilemma: "If refugees are rescued, one creates incentives for further immigrants and victims. On the other hand, one cannot simply let refugees drown" (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6.5.2015:21). In any case, it is appropriate to question anew the migration policy of deterrence and closed borders pursued by many immigration countries today (cf. also ► Unit V 40: "Right to migrate and right to settle freely as human rights").

With regard to labor migration, many states have regulated immigration and emigration in bilateral migration agreements. However, due to the divergent interests of the two states involved, many bilateral migration agreements between emigration and immigration countries only incompletely ensure the human and labor rights of those affected (cf. Cholewinski 2015:240-242). This is all the more true because emigration and immigration countries pursue autonomous and often very different types of migration policies (cf. Battistella 2015:307). Nevertheless, Battistella (2015:320) believes that bilateral and multilateral migration regimes should not be played off against each other.

2.5 Ethnic homogeneity of migration groups as a myth.

Migration can take place as pressure or train migration, as chain migration, as mass exodus or individual migration, as simultaneity of two or more geographically different places of residence and living, as internal migration, as international or even as intercontinental

migration. This means that the effects of migration on those affected and on the environment are correspondingly inconsistent and diverse.

Even diachronically, i.e., over longer periods of time, migration leads to changes that can vary greatly. In any case, migration affects the lives of several generations.

Andreas Wimmer (2005:30/31) pointed out that concepts of diversity, hybridization, creolization, and polyphony have replaced earlier concepts of cultural homogeneity (cf. also ► Unit I 37: "Cultural Identity and Hybridization Tendencies").

One should finally move away from the overly simplistic assumption that ethnic or national groups form, so to speak, uniform and intrinsically homogeneous groups via the transported "mentality" or "culture." Rather, each migration group is subject to very different influences from within and without, which in turn generate specific dynamics, either in the direction of ethnic differentiation or also in the direction of homogenization.

Migration is always an interplay of the transnational space - i.e. of place of origin and destination -, the external conditions of migration and the dynamics and processes within the migration group. One could also apply Jean-Christophe Rufin's (1991:67) phrase "C'est la frontière qui fait le réfugié" to migration in general: It is the borders that turn migrants into foreigners.

Case study

If the Sonderbund War had ended differently in Switzerland in 1847, there might be two states in the territory of today's Switzerland: a Catholic-conservative Central Switzerland and a Protestant-Reformed and liberal Northern Switzerland. In this case, as a Lucerne resident working in Zurich, I would be a foreigner and migrant today - and I would need a residence and settlement permit.

Migration is a constant crossing of borders, and often in both directions. Various actors are involved in this process: The emigrating society, the emigrants and the people in the receiving society. Migrations are extremely complex phenomena. They lead both to new, positive experiences and openings for the migrants, the emigrant society and the host

country, and to the creation or consolidation of barriers and prejudices among the migrants, the emigrant society and the host country.

2.6 Ethical considerations on migration

Migratory movements have always existed in the history of mankind. Accordingly, migratory movements have been and continue to be the rule rather than the exception. Estimates suggest that the earth's future migration potential will exceed 500 million people.

"An ethics of migration, which cannot be fully detached from the question of integration, is primarily concerned with the normative dimensions of social coexistence, consequently with the question of the distribution of resources and with the conflict between different legal rights. This becomes apparent in the distinction between individual rights of freedom and collective norms, as well as in the discussion of foreignness and social belonging. Migration ethics aims at the rational balancing between dignity claims of the individual and interests of a political community" (Kurzke-Maasmeier 2009:105). In this context, the ethical problem is not so much a lack of human rights documents and ideas, but rather "the lack of enforcement of the norms that are in force" (Kurzke-Maasmeier 2009:1005).

On the one hand, this involves the responsibility of society and the state of the receiving countries in connection with the "migration pull" (pull factors) and the question of how globalization can be organized fairly and reconciled with the welfare state. "Next, an ethics of migration has to deal with the protection and development rights of the individual, which can be juxtaposed with the responsibilities of the state. It is also concerned with the validity and enforcement of human rights principles, such as the relationship of the right to emigrate to a right to immigrate. Finally, ethics addresses conditions and limits of social and legal membership in a political community as well as the potential for difference and the solidarity resources of societies" (Kurzke-Maasmeier 2009:106).

In this context, Kurzke-Maasmeier (2009:104) refers to the experience of the Exodus in Jewish history. This experience "is characterized ... by the experience of one's own foreignness and thus by the demand to recognize the vulnerable others in their otherness as

moral subjects and thus also and above all as subjects of law. Such a tradition does not lead to a lukewarm ethics of compassion and care. Rather, Israel's experience of foreignness leads it to unequivocally claim justice for those who seek shelter in the tents (cf. Isa. 54:2). Not love, but justice is the foundation that makes successful life in community possible."

Kurzke-Maasmeier (2009:106) rightly points out the contradiction that today, on the one hand, an (almost) borderless exchange of goods and capital is possible, while on the other hand, people's freedom of movement is severely restricted - and perhaps even more so than in earlier phases of human history. These artificial migration restriction measures even apply to people who have to leave their home region or country in order to survive.

In that human rights "initially [became] effective as legal claims of the subject against the state polity and ... [became] valid as personal rights of freedom, political rights, or cultural and social rights" (Kurzke-Maasmeier 2009:108), they led to a new relationship between the vulnerable individual and the political community. This gave individuals the opportunity to defend themselves against encroachments by society or the state. However, human rights - although often overlooked - also acquire positive legal potential with a normative effect in jurisprudence, especially at the international level: "This becomes visible in the continuing, sometimes considerable gaps in the enforcement of the norms in force in the context of flight and migration" Kurzke-Maasmeier (2009:108).

Globally, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been considered one of the most important actors in "migration management" since the 1990s. In 2014, the IOM had 155 member countries, with an additional 11 countries holding observer status. The IOM operates in more than 100 countries in approximately 470 locations. The organization works in four main areas: (1) migration and development, (2) migration facilitation, (3) migration regulation, and (4) forced migration (see Martin 2014:124). Central to this are discourses around the "best practices" of migration regulation. In 2007, the main objectives of the IOM were summarized as follows: "...to facilitate the orderly and humane management of international migration" (cited in Martin 2014:134). This includes concepts such as security aspects, development and migration, labor markets, repatriation programs, border management, and human rights, among others.

Between 1990 and 1999, accompanying and evacuation measures were at the center of IOM's field activities; from 2000 to 2010, IOM was primarily active in emergency aid for natural disasters (cf. Martin 2014:142/143).

Today, there are at least 15 so-called Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) in almost all regions of the world, i.e. informal forums of state, non-state and intergovernmental actors. These are the most important activity of the IOM today (see Kron 2014:50). However, it is not infrequently forgotten that management - and thus also "migration management" - always includes the authority to issue directives and the power to impose sanctions, and the IOM lacks both. According to Kron, "The agreements reached in the RCPs are voluntary, i.e. not binding. Nevertheless, they are seen by migration management experts as the most significant initiatives in the field of managing intra-regional migration as well as key instruments on the way to establishing a new international migration regime." This very technocratic view is very one-sided and turns a blind eye to the question of power. This is still in the hands of national governments.

Martin Ruhs (2013:39) has put forward the following hypotheses on the relationship between government regulations and labor migration programs on the one hand and the rights of labor migrants on the other:

1. Immigration programs targeted at high-skilled migrants grant more rights to migrants than those programs targeted at lower-skilled migrants.
2. There is a negative correlation (= inverse relationship) between the openness of a high-wage country to migrants and the rights granted to migrants. In other words, the greater the openness to migrants, the fewer rights migrants have.

The second hypothesis, in particular, is surprising: One reason is probably that immigration regulations specifically target and select highly skilled job seekers, while less skilled job seekers are not welcome.

In particular, from a human rights ethical perspective, the following tasks arise:

- Guarantee of legal hearing for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees,

- the duty of the host country to protect migrants and refugees against attacks on their life, freedom, property and dignity,
- guarantee of dignified living conditions.

Kurzke-Maasmeier (2009:118) calls for a "political utopia of open borders" to enforce these goals. He believes that human rights should be complemented by a "right to mobility and immigration." I prefer to speak of a human right to migration and free settlement (cf. ► Unit V 40: "Right to Migration and Right to Free Settlement as Human Rights"). Interesting in this context is the fact that Pope John XXIII already in 1963 (!) in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris* demanded the right for every human being "to emigrate to other states and to take up residence there" "if just reasons so advise" (*Pacem in Terris* 12). Also, Dimitry Kochenov (2015:144) pointed out that territorial borders tend to reinforce the notion that persons belong to states. Whenever a border is drawn, it creates two separate spaces. Accordingly, according to Kochenov 2015:145, the right to migrate means nothing more than leaving the space on one side of the border and moving to the space on the other side of the border. The right to migrate means the freedom to "vote with one's feet"-and the drawing of borders, not infrequently centuries ago, without a right to migrate means, through political developments in the past, curtailing the freedom of those living today-a rather nonsensical practice that would probably not be accepted in any other sphere. The problem is that, while Article 13 of the Declaration of Human Rights guarantees departure from and return to one's country of origin or residence, it lacks a corresponding right to enter and settle in another country of one's choice.

Art. 13, para. 2 of the European Declaration of Human Rights

Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Exactly the opposite position to a fundamental right to free migration and settlement is taken by Razin and Sadka (2014:66). The two authors are explicitly of the opinion that free migration is "no longer possible" worldwide. Unlike the practice in the United States before World War I, when immigration was more or less free, Razin and Sadka (2014:66) argue that welfare states would be hopelessly overwhelmed by immigration. But apart from the fact that immigrants as a whole pay more to welfare systems than they receive from them, this

would certainly no longer be the case if the calculation were no longer made at the national level but at the global level and all costs - including those in the emigration countries - were included in the calculation.

It should be borne in mind that a considerable part of the social costs in the emigration countries are caused by the unjust world trade and world economic system. Moreover, quite a few countries in the South neglect to protect their citizens. Therefore, Satvinder Juss (2015:127) demanded from all nation states a new responsibility to protect its citizens: this responsibility arises from what a state does or allows within its borders. This applies in particular to genocides or mass brutalities. The nation-state in question should be held accountable first, and the international community second.

In his all-out attack on all those who oppose a restrictive refugee policy of the nation-states, Ulrich H. J. Körtner (in *Materialdienst der EZW* 12/2015:443/444), a systematic theologian at the University of Vienna, asserted the impossibility of an ethical stance with regard to the refugee question. Thus, the motto "No human being is illegal - Refugees welcome" is fatal in terms of democratic politics, because with it civil society cuts off the branch on which it is sitting. And Körtner accuses the representatives of this attitude of not giving sufficient thought to the effects on the political community. With respect, perhaps Körtner should think about whether his concept of democratic politics is not all too tied to the nation-state. Even if Körtner's opinion is correct - which is very doubtful - that Angela Merkel is breaking EU law by welcoming refugees, it might be more appropriate to question the legal foundations of the EU and the nation-states with regard to foreigners. Körtner's proposal to give asylum seekers the opportunity to apply for asylum already in their country of origin has existed for a long time with regard to individual countries, without it having any effect on refugee numbers or smuggling. And that a "responsible ethical" - read: restrictive - attitude towards refugees would be "well evangelical" (Körtner in *Materialdienst der EZW* 12/2015:444) can be doubted with good knowledge and conscience.

2.7 Six theses on migration

1. Migration is a survival strategy for people in distress, disaster and war zones and thus a kind of compensation for social, economic, political and other inequalities. Or it is a strategy to improve the general living situation.
2. Migration movements are the consequence of resource scarcity, one-sided consumption of resources by Western Europe and North America as well as emerging countries like China or India, the emergence of new economic needs and the destruction of traditional ecological balances
3. Migration has been and continues to be an integral part and consequence of economic development and has both positive and negative impacts on regions of emigration.
4. Migration takes place to a considerable extent within and between the countries of the southern hemisphere.
5. Migration benefits the countries of immigration.
6. Migration and flight movements are an expression of growing deterritorialization (see Blitz 2014).

3. Control Questions

1. What is a migrant?
2. How many migrants are estimated to live on earth today?
3. What does "internal migration" mean?
4. Name and briefly explain the seven most important migration theories.
5. What are pull and push factors?
6. What questions must a migration ethic answer?
7. Read the five theses on migration in chapter 2.6 and consider whether you agree or disagree with them. Give reasons for your opinion.
8. What do you think about the demand for a guaranteed human right to migration and free settlement?

9. What are the benefits of the IOM's Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) and what are their limitations?
10. What does Satvinder Juss (2015:127) mean by his proposal of a new responsibility to protect?

4. Links

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Migration

<http://www.bpb.de/themen/8T2L6Z,0,0,Migration.html>

Staatssekretariat für Migration (SEM): Zahlen, Fakten, Dienstleistungen

<https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home.html>

Herzlich willkommen bei migration-online!

Auf der Internetseite des Bereichs Migration & Qualifizierung des DGB Bildungswerk finden Sie Informationen, Fakten und Daten rund um das Thema Migration und Arbeitswelt. Wir qualifizieren Menschen, die sich in der Arbeitswelt zu Migration engagieren und etwas bewegen wollen.

<http://www.migration-online.de/>

Rat für Migration

Der Rat für Migration ist ein bundesweiter Zusammenschluss von Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftlern.

Der Rat sieht seine zentrale Aufgabe in einer öffentlich kritischen Begleitung der Politik in Fragen von Migration und Integration. Er setzt sich seit rund einem Jahrzehnt in seinen Publikationen, Auftritten in der Öffentlichkeit und Stellungnahmen in den Medien für eine differenzierte Politik in Deutschland ein, die Migration und Integration aktiv und weitsichtig gestaltet.

<http://www.rat-fuer-migration.de/>

Netzwerk Migration in Europa

<http://www.network-migration.org/>

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Unit I 30: Migration

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